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This thesis is devoted to the study of bargaining using the
In Part I (chapters
1 examine commitment inthe role of bilateralwe
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bargaining process over the terms of trade.
methods of non-cooperative game theory.
and 2)
theory 















thankful to Frank Hahn for reading the first draft of chapter
5 .
3 and 5,
Cambridge, for financial support


















I am grateful to King's College, 
for the past three years.
My thanks to Ann Widdop for typing chapters 3 and 4. I am most 
grateful and thankful to Bobbie Coe for typing the rest of the thesis.
My thanks go to Ken Binmore for his valuable comments  the first 
draft of chapter 5 which improved the exposition at several points.
Moreover, , David Canning for being a dedicated 




While working on 
various ways. I
a source of constant inspiration to me.
this thesis several individuals have helped me in 
.  would like to take the opportunity to 
thanks to all of them.
Appreciation is due to the participants of the Economic 
workshop at the University of Cambridge for their helpful comments 





comments on the  draft of
Rubinstein for giving me 
bargaining theory 
5 in particular, 
chapter 5 were most
I wish to thank Partha Dasgupta for his helpful comments 
first drafts of chapters 1 and 5 and for discussing with 













The role of commitment in bargaining I 4
Chapter 2
The role of commitment in bargaining II 26
PART TWO: OUTSIDE OPTIONS
Chapter 3
Bargaining, search and the 'Outside Option Principle' 37
Chapter 4
A note on bargaining with many outside options 79
PART THREE: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
Chapter 5






pervasive phenomena in modern societies,a
a bazaar.
interesting. occupies important inMoreover, placean
economic sincetheory, the "pure bargaining is theat
This,
therefore,
In this thesis we non-
I and IIParts
with commitmentthe roles of and outside options in bilateral
The starting point this thesis isfor the classic bypaper
Rubinstein (1982) . that RubinsteinIn presentspaper, a non-
cooperative infinite-time horizon sequential with completegame
information, which represents a bargaining process. In that game, the
bargainers make offers alternately untiltwo theagreement on
partition of the surplus is reached. Rubinstein proved the existence
of a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium partition. One may interpret
the exemplifiesRubinstein that the role of time ingame as one
bilateral bargaining.
All the bargaining games to be presented in this thesis either are
based this alternating-offers sequential due toon game
infinite-time horizon sequential Furthermore,innotion game.an
thesis "method of will depend thatthe our on
In this thesis we shall restrict attention to bargaining games with
game is an example.
on
would bethat concern us . tothe issues
opposite pole of economic phenomena from
is another important reason to study bargaining.
shall study bargaining using the methods of 
cooperative game theory.
throughout 
presented by Rubinstein in his 1982 paper.
bargaining. Part III deals with embedding a bilateral bargaining model 
in a large market context.
complete information, of which Rubinstein's (1982) 
board this assumption so as to cast away the issues 








alone the study of bargaining is useful and 
bargaining
entirely
Rubinstein or else incorporate the essence of this alternating-offers
Bargaining is   ties, ranging 
from trade and wage negotiations to arms control talks to haggling in 
For this reason
We shall take on 
that arise with incomplete information;
A future research programme





informationof differential thekinds models betocertain toadd
the outcomes. However t may a
will wait untilhave the confusion thatresearch to
in this Binmorecontext
(chapters 1 and 2) of the thesisI
commitment in bilateral different notions ofTwo
sequential with complete and perfectgames
information.
firstThe notion commitmentof that explore iswe
the future cost of backing down from committed bargaining positiona
(for example. budge from offer,not to not to acceptan or an
thisopponent's offer). notion, making commitment is costless,In a
but revoking a commitment is costly.
In the second notion of commitment that we explore, is
making iscommitment costly, commitmenttrue: isa a
costless. in that, a
bargainer chooses, strategically, the length of time for which he is
committed.
himself. Thus,a
a demand (i.e.,commitment la genuinea
unconditional take-it-or-leave-it offer) only if a bargainer chooses
to commit himself for an infinite length of time.
of this thesis we examine the role ofIn Part II
modelsTwooutside are
each model is a
account
essentially the issue is that
some
differ in their approachoutside toan
(1987b) provides a thought-provoking discussion of the possible causes 
of this confusion and the possible routes to remedy.
"Nash
Commitment in this second notion is irrevocable during the 
length of time that  bargainer has chosen to commit 
is irrevocable game"
programme 
currently resides in the literature 
with incomplete information" is resolved;
the following.
Bargainers can take actions during the negotiation process to increase
presented in this thesis and then investigate the resulting change in 
equilibrium mes. , it  be noted that such
(chapters 3 and 4) 
options in bilateral bargaining.    presented, 
non-cooperative infinite-time horizon sequential game 
with complete information. Both models explicitly take into 
the search dimension of the situation: 
the bargainers have to engage in  sort of search in order to find 
option. The two models
bargaining.
commitment in bargaining are explored in two different non-cooperative 
infinite-time horizon
In Part
on "the correct analysis of games
we examine the role of
but revoking










market which the institution formationtheory of a
(i.e., the buyers and thedecentralised. The of the marketagents
location. The theory,sellers) do know each others'not, ex-ante,
matching technology within which thetherefore, includes agentsa
sellerpartners with When buyer andsearch for whom to trade. a a
the terms ofthey initiate a sequential bargaining processmeet, over
concerned with embeddingtrade. other words, chapter 5 isIn a
bilateral bargaining model in a large market context.
Throughout the thesis, the solution concept that we shall employ in
analyse bargaining is the perfectorder the sub-gameto games
equilibrium concept due to Selten (1965, 1975) .
Finally, caution. The chapters self-contained, inword of area
This has meantthat each chapter can be read independently. that(a)
statements will appear in each of the chapters, for example, thesome
definitions bargaining situation andof of the sub-game perfecta
equilibrium numbering equations,and (b) that the ofconcept,
chapter is independent from that of
any other chapter.
modelling the interlacing of the search and bargaining processes. Once 
takes the search dimension of the situation into account,  has
(chapter 5), we develop a 
of price  is
"views"
"view"
In the final part of the thesis, 
in
to form a
footnotes and figures in any one
Part III
on how the search and bargaining processes ought 












examine the rolethe shall ofthis and nextIn we
each of the two chapters,.commitment In a
notion of a non­
complete andwithgame
is cannotIt aonenow
Binmore (1987, 1) for(see and an
discussion of this point).
other hand,theOn
an importantThere isliterature. no
by paper
commitment offocused thewhere he on
thefact,In as a




of backing downthe future from one' scostincreasethat
demand.









great deal of attention in this
doubt that commitment must have
Schelling   impressionistically  by way 
examples, but the essential idea seems to involve making a demand and 
'burning one's bridges',  taking actions during the negotiation
bargaining.
struggle between bargainers 
convince their opponent that they will not retreat from - advantageous
(b) time and (c) information within the bargaining process 
introductory
a generalised version of this very idea will 
with
in which commitments are irrevocable. In the Nash demand game, 
is only one stage, in which bargainers simultaneously make demands.
chapter 
in bilateral bargaining.
model will be presented that will capture some of the features of the 
commitment in bargaining. Each of the models is 
cooperative infinite-time horizon sequential 
perfect information.
role in shaping the outcome in bilateral bargaining situations, 





fairly well-established that   usually offer 
sensible estimate of what is likely to happen in bilateral bargaining 
situations without having a  the roles to be ascribed to (a) 
commitment,
(1953) demand game can be viewed as a model of commitment 
as is
hardly been explored in the recent literature on 
game-theoretic strategic approach to bargaining, 
time and information have received a
process
In this chapter, 
formalised   game-theoretic 
informational asymmetries).
Chap.
















The be(to in 2) hassecton
In a can
histo, not to not to acceptor
offer. theto a means
takes actions






























budge from his < 
Commitment
stage, 
firstly, that it is rarely the case that commitments are irrevocable. 
Secondly, that the notion of simultaneous demands is not particularly 
realistic in most bilateral bargaining situations. And thirdly, that 
bargaining processes ought  be modelled  infinite-time horizon
equal to one
denote the cost to player i of backing down from his 
bargaining position and 8
section 3  prove: (a) for
cB) * (0,1-8+e)
opponent's er.     position 
following. The player    it costly 
later back down from this bargaining position. Commitment is therefore 
revocable, st. Commitment to a bargaining position can lead 
the bargaining process into  "concession game", a game in which one 
of the bargainers has to concede in order for the bargaining process 
to either yield  agreement or proceed to a game of fresh offers and 
counteroffers.
Let C£(i=A,B) < 
commitment to a
formalise Schelling's view of 
non-cooperative infinite-time horizon sequential 
and complete information.   complete 
the usual problems   incomplete 
games, and besides the interest of this chapter is solely 
in examining the role of commitment in bargaining.
In this chapter we 




demand represents an unconditional take-it-or-leave-it offer. Recently 
Crawford (1982) has studied  simple two-stage game of incomplete 
information in which there is uncertainty about the extent to which 
commitments are genuinely irrevocable. In his game the bargainers, 
first make demands simultaneously.   be noted,
cB>0 
any £>0,  (iii) 
vo w, for any £>0, and for any 8<1 the bargaining game has 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium partition in which the player who 
first offer (i.e., starts the bargaining) receives payoff 
and the other player receives payoff equal to 

















he to not to
demand. His from hiscost is























' Cj>l-8 and 
the bargaining game 
(i) in which player i receives 
j receives payoff equal to o, and 
receives payoff equal  1-8 
and on the other hand,
incur a
of backing down 
stage in the bargaining process 
players have made mutually incompatible commitments. Commonsense would 
suggest that the player with the ’’negligible cost" (i.e., who made 
the demand) should ’’concede", that is back down from his commitment to
since he knows that his opponent will 
large cost. Working 
in which the player who makes 
demands the whole surplus and commits not to budge 
from this demand, ought not to be sub-game perfect. Note that the fact 
that the player who makes the first offer (i.e., the 
commit himself before the responder
wish to
to budge from his demand, 
"concede" because his opponent will 
see that this equilibrium,
our view,
perfect equilibrium partitions,  in which the player who makes the 
first offer receives payoff equal to one and the other player receives 
payoff equal to zero, and (ii) in which the player who makes the first 
offer receives payoff equal to 1/(1+8) and the other player receives 
payoff equal to 8/(1+8) (i.e., the Rubinstein solution),
for i*jz i,j=A,B: for ^   c^   8<1, 
player i makes the 
subgame perfect equilibrium partitions, 
payoff equal to one and player
(ii)  which player i and player j 
receives payoff equal to 8,  if player j makes 
then the bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium partition in which player j receives payoff equal to 
and player i receives payoff equal to zero.
first sight,
To explain why it seems counterintuitive we take the 
where the player who makes the first offer has a negligible cost 
of backing down from his commitment to a bargaining position, 
the other player has a large cost of backing down from his commitment 
to  bargaining position.  the equilibrium, the player 
"negligible cost" demands the whole surplus and commits himself to not 
to budge from this demand, and the other player accepts, 
this player (i.e., the responder) deviates, 
demand; furthermore,  commits
Now suppose 











down commitment indeed greater
ii than the ofcost















player will not 
optimal for the 
because if he





what is a reasonable explanation for result (a)?"




respond  his 
(if the offer is coupled with 
matter how large is 
to not to accept the
The question 
down, and thus,
argument is in fact reflected in Schelling's 
quite ingly, that in bargaining 
the player with the large cost 
should  have
Schelling  argues, 
"weakness is often strength"; 
of backing  from his 
bargaining strength"   player with 
backing down from his commitment. But we have here, 
result that appears to contradict this very commonsensical notion.
(negligible) 
commitment - hence a negative payoff, 
mutually incompatible commitments, 
Realising this,  player 
opponent's demand will accept any offer 
a commitment to  to budge from the offer) 
of backing down from his commitment
The commonsense
Sub-game perfection 
negligible cost prevents the 
to commit himself to not to budge from demanding the whole surplus.
revocable at a
the negligible
in this chapter, a
either. This is
player is correct to realise that the "large 
"concede". But, given the equilibrium, it is not 
"negligible cost" player to
"concedes", then the bargaining process proceeds into a 
subgame which begins with the "large cost" player demanding the whole 
surplus and committing himself to not to budge from this demand, 
the "negligible cost" 











is therefore revocable t cost. toat a a
"concession
a
t>l,The the subgame time depends theofstructure at t zany on
history.








1 is placed at the end of section 4.i Figure
(j=A,B) made an offer to player i 
i=A,B) but player j did not commit himself to not to budge from
i.e., player i 
and
(i*j,
his offert and player i rejects the offer.





(denote it by G^_)
Player i makes an offer and decides whether, 
himself to not to budge from his offer, 
denotes  commit"(x,a)e [0,1]X{C,NC},
"not to commit"; refer to Figure I.1
Two players, are bargaining on the partition of a pie of 
size one. The pie will be partitioned only after the players reach 
agreement. The players make offers alternately. In the bargaining 
process a player can commit himself to,  to budge from his offer, 




bargaining position can lead the bargaining process into a 
game", a game in which one of the players has to concede in order for 
the bargaining process to either yield an agreement or proceed to 
game of fresh offers and counteroffers.
The bargaining process  a non-cooperative infinite­
time horizon sequential game with complete and perfect information. 
The time dimension of bargaining process is discrete, te{0,1,2, . . . } .
If a=NC, then player j es: he either accepts  or rejects 
("R") the offer. If player j accepts the offer, then the game ends. If 
player j rejects the offer, then the game proceeds,
at time t,
accept  opponent's 
position means the following. The player takes actions 
costly for him  later back down from this bargaining position. 
Commitment   , but   st. Commitment
t
10
he either accepts the offer ("Ac")moves: or
commits himselfoffer to the offernotto accept
offer but commit himselfdoes If("RNC").notor
If player j chooses then"RC",
where the players have made mutuallyawe are
Thus, the game proceeds, time t+1,at
game"t be described below in (2)to (denoted by
iswhere the offer which player ito has Ifx
jplayer chooses then the proceeds, time t+1,at togame
another game"f to be described below in (3)
L±(x) ,
(2) Suppose at time t-1 player i (i=A,B) has
offer, (XG [0,1] ) , and player j (j*i, j=A,B)not to x
has committed himself the offer they haveto tonot x;
at time t,Then, the subgame has the following
Player istructure. does notmoves: or
concede ("Neon") . If iplayer concedes, then time theat t game
proceeds to the subgame G-, described in (1) above. If player i does
not concede,
whether concedeto ("Neon"). If player jnot toor
concedes, If player jends . does concede, thennot at
time t+2 the game proceeds to the subgame K^(x).
(3) Suppose at time t-1 player i (is=A,B) has committed himself to




i concedes, then time the("Neon") . at tconcede game
above.(1)
not to If playerconcede jortowhether
jIf player does not concede, then at
rejects the 







. then the game ends. 
situation
accept 
committed themselves to incompatible bargaining positions.
then player j 
and
"concession (denoted by 
where x is the offer to which player i has committed himself).
proceeds to the subgame Gj, described in  ve. If player i does 
not concede, then at time t+1 the game proceeds where player j decides 
("Con")    concede ("Neon") .
j (j*i, j=A,B)
has rejected the offer but has not committed himself to not to accept
3
then at time t+1 the game proceeds where player j decides 
concede ("Con")
subgame (denote it by (x)) has the following 
he either concedes ("Con")  does not
to budge from an
budge from an
(denote it by (x) ) 
he either concedes ("Con")
concedes, then the game ends.















(8<1) thebe the Let
fromtocost a
(t>0)time offert to an x
be the times. at which player
"commitment" . Then, to
player i is:
shall that the (i=A,B) is of completeWe Gassume a game
information, i. e . , common knowledge
isFurthermore,
make at






t=0 is Ga 
the
where XA=X and







all information is assumed to be
(i.e., the bargaining process) begins at t=0. The game at 
according to whether it is player A or player B who 
offer (i.e., starts the bargaining);  and GB 







player i of backing down 
position. Suppose the players agree at 
• N •(xe[0,l]). Let {tfc} 1 , up until time t, 
i backs down from  .  the discounted payoff
a game of perfect
A strategy for each agent in G^ will tell the agent the choice to 
each and every decision node that he may be at. Each of the 
strategies from which 
concept  will  is the subgame perfect 
equilibrium (SGPE) (Selten (1965, 1975)). A strategy tuple is in SGPE 
if its restriction to any subgame is in Nash equilibrium.
note that
that the players maximise expected utility.
(common) discount factor.  c^, i=A,B, (c£>0) be 




















0 if x--C-i <03 3
(la)
if X.1-C4 >03 3



















for any 8<1 the
K?(x)=k?(x) =




k?(x) (K?(x)) denote the infimum (supremum) of the payoffs to 
player j in any SGPE of the subgame K^(x). Then the infimum (supremum) 
of the payoffs to player j in any SGPE as of point (2) (in Figure 1) 
is max{Xj-Cj, 8k^(x)} (max{Xj-Cj, 8k?(x)J).
j=A,B) 
solution). (c) 
any Cj>l-8 and for any 8<1, 
in which player i 
receives payoff equal to zero, and (ii) in which player i 
receives payoff equal to 1-8 and player j receives payoff equal to 8, 
and the game Gj 
payoff equal to one and player i receives payoff equal to
CA: 
game G^ (i=A,B) has two  partitions, 
receives payoff equal to one and player j(j^i, 
equal to zero, and  in which player i receives payoff equal to 
1/(1+8) and player j (j^i,  payoff equal to 8/(1+8) 
the Rubinstein (1982) ion), For i^j, i,j=A,B we have: 
for Cj_=0 and for the game Gj_ has two SGPE 





d l  game G^ (i=A,B)
which player i receives payoff equal to one and player j 
receives payoff equal to r , (b) For cA=cB=0 and for 
(i)
If at point (1) player 
Cj,8K£(x)} and k? (x)=8max{xj-cj
If, on
(i) (cA,cB)*(0,0) , 
cB) & (1-8+e, 0 ) for any e>0, 
unique SGPE partition in 
(j*i, j=A,B) 


















M^=l-min{8mj, min{I^:xe [0,1] } }i . e . , (4a)
and
l2 and are definedA A
I.
SGPE as of point (5) (
l3=8max{k2(x),1?(x)}
of the payoffs to player j in any SGPE as of 
• note that both the infimum and the supremum
m^=l-min{8mj,
mf=max{1-8m^, 1-min{S^:xe [ 0,1] } }, X J X
By repeating the above argument
supremum of the payoffs to player j in any SGPE of the subgame L^(x); 
denote this infimum (supremum) by l?(x)(L?(x)).
min{S^:xG [0,1]}}, (4b)
of the payoffs to player i in
i . e ., 
where m^(M^) is the infimum (supremum) 
any SGPE of the game Gj_.
infimum (supremum) of the payoffs 
in Figure 1) by l3(S^).
If at point (4) player i chooses
L?(x)=1?(x)=8xj




Let us now compute and S^ for all xe(0,l]; 
by equations (3a) and (3b).
The infimum (supremum) < 
point (6) is l-8mj(1-8Mj) ;
are independent of
can establish the infimum and
"Con", then
"Neon”, then
If, on the other hand, at point (4) player i chooses 
1 j / x j 1 (x) =mj and
in anyDenote the
j is the infimum (supremum) 













sj = 8max{M^, 8x_i} 




S7 = 8max{M^, 8(x--c^)}



























x = [0,1] }
and Mj-
[0,1] at point (1) player i chooses 
chooses "Neon". Then, using equations
and
Suppose for an xg[0,1] at point (1) player i chooses 
"Con". Then, using equations (lb),
mi
XG [0,1] 
and at point (4) player i chooses 
(3a) and (3b), we obtain:
li = 8max{m^, 8(x_i-c-)} and 
* J J J
XG [0,1]
(4) player i chooses
for x=l equation (5) applies,





. Then, using equations (la) ,
s3 = J
(II)
at point (4) player i chooses




CASE A: Suppose when i=A and j=B, 
any x<l either equation (5) 
suppose when i=B and j=A, for x=0 equation 
x>0 either equation (5) or (6) or (7) or
(I) Suppose for an xg 
at point (4) player i 
(2a), (3a) and (3b), we obtain: 
s3=lj=52
Let us now proceed to compute 
are defined by equations (4a) and (4b).
"Con
and at point
(2a), (3a) and (3b), we obtain:
= 8max{m-, 8x^} and x J J

15
defined bywhether the equilibrium payoffs,checkLet asus now
with the supposition made above (Caseare
(i=A,B)i choosesstatesA) . at
i=A, x=0 if i=B.points (1) and (4) , and for
equilibrium player ithen ininstead chooses "Con", the a
and incurs strictlysurplus equal to zero
choice.negative Thus r indeed, optimal
is also an optimal choice.Furthermore, then
withsupposition is thethe (Case A)Hence,
equilibrium payoffs, defined by equation (9) , for (Inany c
player i chooses for all xg [0,1]fact,
for anyHence,
A pair strategies that thisof solution is follows.as
Player i (i=A,B) always offers where
1 if i=A
0 if i=B
and commits himself to to budge from this offer. Player j (j*i,not
j=A,B) if itoffer is commitment, andaccepts any a
accepts offers smaller than is coupled withoffer not a
Player icommitment. concedesnever
xg [0,1] . j alwaysfor Playerany a
concedes if x■<c;;but furthermore, playernever
Suppose when i=A and j=B, the largest xg [0,1], for whichCASE B: x,
for such that and forsome
(7) (8) applies, anyany or or
(6) (8) applies; and suppose(7)or oror
j=A, for which equationand smallest XG [0,1] , (5)when the x,
is and forfor such that anysome
(7)or or
2






for any xg [0,1] .
★ x±= -



















in the subgames K^(x) 
concedes in  subgame
"Neon”
"consistent"










concedes in the subgame Lj_(x)
l>eA>0, 
and for
Here we can allow 8<1. But the condition 8<1 is required to prove the 
"inconsistency” of the other possible suppositions (to be discussed below) with 
the equilibrium payoffs that they generate; 8-1 leads to multiple equilibria in 
these other suppositions, which would then allow us to choose an equilibrium that 
would be consistent with a given supposition. Thus 8<1 is a necessary requirement 




1>£b>0,    0<x<£B





























Therefore, equation (11) holds if




















B _ TB!-eA “ ]--eA ’ 


















now check whether this equilibrium is "consistent" 
supposition made above (Case B).
equation (5) applies, . .  player A 
and (4). Therefore, using equations (la) 







When i=A and j=B   equation (5)
for any x>l-eA player  "Con" either at point (1)
(4) or at both points (1) and (4).  for any 8<1,
8/(1+8) - A >0
Since 1/[8(1+8)]>8/(1+8) equations (12) and (13) =>
for i=A,B,
for x=l-eA
equation (5) or (6) or
ei




- - -B • -- ------ - k± “5 l 1 ) B
equation (16)), A (l  1A (l-eA) =8eA.
(3) player B  "Con". Thus, for player 
at points (1) and (4) it must be the case, that for any 8<1, 
[l-eA]8>[8/(1+8)-cA] . (17)
















[8/ (1+8) -cA]>8x=8 [l-£A+y] ,
[8/(1+8)-ca]>8[1-ea] .that This
the hold (10) ,
foras one can
with the
the supposition of Case B is false, for any
Suppose when i=A and
or or or
xg [0,1],suppose





described in equations 














Hence the equilibrium, 
(12), is not "consistent" 




exists an x, e  such that 





exist such [1 cB 
ea>1/ [8/(1+8)],
[£A~cB]>8/(1+8). Hence, there
[l-x-cB]>8/(1+8), i.e., such that x<[l- 




for any 0<x<l either equation 
when i=B and j=A, the smallest x, 
(5) applies is b, for  eb 
either equation (6)    (8) applies, 
equation (5)  (6) or (7) or (8) applies.
of equation
prove by similar 
’’consistent”
By assuming that  other possibilities 
such   i, j=A, B, i^j, irij, Mj> £j_8, 
arguments that the equilibrium obtained is not 
supposition of Case B.
We first observe that there 
cb>5/(1+8) , provided 8<1/'V2 . There 
8/(1+8) ] > [1-£A] <=> [EA-cB] > [8/(1+8) ] . From equation (12), tA. . . .
and from , 8/(1+8) >cB=>28/(1+8) > [cB+8/(1+8) ] .
Thus a- J 8/  .
for x=l equation (5) applies and 
(6)  (7)  (8) applies; and 
for which equation 
B^u  and for any 0<x<eb 
and for any l>x>eB either
given our supposition,  any 1 a player A chooses 
either at point (1) or at point (4) or at both points (1) and (4); in 
particular for x= . Since [l-x-cB]>8/(1+8) , which implies l-x>8/(l+8), 
player B will choose ” either at point (2) (if player A chooses 
"Con" at point (1))  at point  (if player A chooses "Con" 
point (4)) or at both points. In order for it to be optimal for player 
"Con" we require













cB>0 and for any 8<1.
3xe [0,1] (5)
















that equation (5) applies.
’’consistent”
such that equation







One can show that this equilibrium, 
consistent" with the
Let us now check whether this equilibrium is 
supposition made above (Case E) .
Then, we obtain that
Thus, provided 8<1, we obtain:
MA=mA=1// <1+S> 
M|=m|=l/(1+5) .
can show that this equilibrium,  described by equation (19) , 
not "consistent” with  supposition of Case C, above, for 
cB>0 and for any 8<1.
Then, we obtain that
Then, we obtain that,
Suppose when i=A and j=B, 
Vxg[0,1]  equation 
suppose when i=B
as described by equation (20), 
supposition of Case D, above, for
applies and 
(8) applies; and 
for which equation 
l>eA>0, and for any 
(8) applies, and for any 0<x<l- 
(8) applies.
applies  x=l-eA, for  ea 
l>x>l-eA either equation (6) or (7) or 
either equation (5) or (6) or (7)
Suppose when i=B and j=A, 
for any l>x>0 either equation (5) 




(i=A,B) will choose either at
(1) and point
for i=A,B (23)
and (4) . Takeor or
it implies that
choose
(1) ) chooses at
we require
5/(1+8)-ca>8[1/(1+8)-cB]
i . e . f (24)
Symmetrically, when i=B and j=A, we require
(25)
>0 and 8<1,For any
(26)A
For any cB>0 and 8<1,
(27)B
and obtain: i . e . ,we
This is a contradiction.
(25) and (27) A'
i.e., ScA>cA,
and 8<1,If,




Similarly, combining (24), 
for any 8<l,cB>0 and cA>0 .
CA:
Con”
cB>0 such that (cA,
8ca>cb>8cb>c











then the above arguments 
c^=cR=0 and 8<1, then
"Con"Since for any xg[0,1] player i 




((26),    go through. ahu xx ^“^B
equilibrium payoffs (defined by (22)) are indeed 
supposition of Case E.
(24), (25)  (26)
for any 8<l,cA>0 and cB>0.
When i=A and j=B, for any xg[0,1] player A will choose 
at point (1)  at point (4)  at both points (1) 
Since l-x-cB=8/(1+8) and l-x>8/(1+8), 
”Con” either at point (2) (if player A chooses 
(if player A  ”Con”
In order for it to be optimal for A to
x=[l/(1+8)-cb]. 
player B will  
"Con” at point ) or at point (3) 
point (4)) or at both points, 
choose "
(4), we must
on the other hand,
Thus, the equilibrium payoffs (as defined by equation (22)) are not 
"consistent” with the supposition made above (Case E) , for any 









When i=A and the that for xe [0,1]
(1)
(1) and (4) .
If then this not optimal, since by choosing
If
(2)




which is a contradiction since x>0. then the
are
>1-5.
Then Thus, for all xg [0,1] , Thus, not
exist choose given thatBan
choosesA ifHence, and then the
(as defined indeedby are
I
any




there■ - ~B- 
would
j=B, 
player A will choose 
both points
"Con"




cA>0,   is definitely 
















either at point 








Suppose when i=A and j=B, 3xe [0,1] 
applies (i.e., Vxe[0,l] either equation (6) 
equation (8) applies); and suppose when i=B and j=A, 
















then choosing  can be optimal. Firstly, 
Thus, there exists an l>x>0, say x,
—5—£ for ll. Then l-x>5 and l-x-cB>S.
(if player A chooses
(if player A
for it to be optimal for A to
Let x=l-cB
chooseplayer B will 
"Con" at point 
point (4))
Let us now check whether this equilibrium is 
supposition made above (Case F).
Thus if cA=0 and cb<1-5, 
equilibrium payoffs (as defined by equation (28))  not "consistent" 
with the supposition made above (Case F) . Secondly, 
1-cb<5.    e[0 l , l-x-cn<5. 
xg [0,1]
Then, we obtain that
____
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conclusion: for any 8<1 and for 
MA=mA=1•
any





Proposition. For i^jz i,j=A,B: for c^=0 and for any
8<1 the game G^ has two SGPE partitions and the game Gj 





For cA=Cg=0 and for any  game G^ 




Symmetric to Case Fz 
Therefore, by similar arguments one arrives at the following 
any ca>1-8 and for cB=0z MB=mB=l-8 and
game G^
stated in
have considered all the possible suppositions.










opponent'sto, not to not toor an
offer.
commitments (for if of theone








the Introduction (section argued that first sight1)In atwe












In order to re-emphasize the apparently 
(a)   illustrate  special case, 
commitment
=CB
The Proposition (section 3) 
that (i) (cA,cB)*(0,0) , (ii)
)*(l-8+£, 0) for any £>0,
for
’’first mover” of backing down from his commitment to not
In this chapter we have presented a model that examines the role of 
commitment in bilateral bargaining;   is  non-cooperative 
horizon sequential   complete and perfect
budge from one's
Thus commitment is revocable,
Schelling's
weakness is often strength”, 
paradoxical nature of result 
Suppose the responder's  of backing down from his 
not to accept the ’’first mover's” offer is infinite relative to the 
cost to the
bargaining process, represented by  sequential game, 
incorporates commitment possibilities  la Schelling (see Schelling 
(1956)): the bargainers can take actions during the bargaining process 
that increase the future cost of backing down from one's commitment 
offer,
established, (a)  any cA,cB>0
(cA, cB) (0,1-8+e) for any £>0, and (iii) 
a,cb ^ 1 O e,U t  and for any 8<1 the uniqueness of the 
SGPE partition,   cA=cB=  and for any 8<1 the multiplicity of 
SGPE partition,  (c) for i^j, i,j=A,B: for C£=0 and for any 
Cj>l-8 and for any 8<1 the uniqueness of the SGPE partition for the 
game Gj and the multiplicity of the SGPE partition for the game Gj_.
Mutually incompatible   example, 
bargainers commits himself to not to budge from an offer and the other 
bargainer commits himself 
bargaining process into  ’’concession game",  game in which one of 
the bargainers has to concede in order for the bargaining process to 
either yield an   proceed to a  of fresh offers and
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hasThen it if theis noas
(i.e.. has
while the responder
make commitment to not toancan
In thisdemand. scenario, toone
theobtain the whole surplus. and notishe does;But as
theavailable commitment (seeresponder, who has irrevocablean
apparentlyIntroduction, give explanation for this,where we an
paradoxical, result).
of theimplicationsshall theWe venturenow some on
andin general,result of this chapter, for theory
Rubinstein's (1982) classic paper in particular.
Observe, 0that
But,
positive, then the uniqueness property is obtained.
notion inOur bargaining incorporates the alternating-offersgame
bargaining, due to Rubinstein (1982) .
Rubinstein haveof the However, as weas a game.
seen,
for values of andsome
on their specifying a unique equilibrium.
strictly positive, thethat if both thenhaveWe costsseen are
Rubinstein solution disappears and the bargaining game has a unique
in the sense, thatequilibrium. This equilibrium can be called




our bargaining game is built.
study the implications ofAn alternative angle from which to our
result is the following.




would not expect the
it   if he,
the uniqueness property of the Rubinstein game does not survive 
This is indeed disturbing, especiallyc^  Cg • 
since the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining models rests mainly
"bad",
"incorrect"
to budge from his offer, 
possibility of commitment 
the future cost of backing down from his demand) , 
irrevocable     accept his opponent's
bargaining) would not obtain the whole surplus, 
imply that something fundamental is wrong with our bargaining model. 
Maybe it is   model of bargaining? If  then one may in 
effect criticise the alternating-offers model of bargaining,
no actions available to increase
A CB 
not possess the uniqueness property.
In fact,
"first mover"
one may view our game
for c
"first mover"






commitment possibilities are not allowedTake the Rubinstein game;
and time plays the key role in determining the bargaining outcome.
is presumably theIt
should be stable in the presence of small perturbations.
outsideif of the bargainers availableexample, hasFor one an
bargainingoption it will Rubinsteinknow that affect thenotwe
this isprovided the value of the outside option is small;outcome”
(1985) .'Outside Option Principle' discovered by Binmorethe famous
is indeed stable in theRubinsteintheHence t
presence of small perturbations from outside of this type.
the bargainers, in Rubinsteineach of the hasNow suppose game,
been given an action which each in order commit himselftake tocan
histo budge from offer f the opponent'sto, not not to acceptor
the action makes it costly for a player to later back down fromoffer;
committed bargaining position. bothAnd these costs, tosupposea
players, negligible. This is small perturbation thetoare a
Rubinstein game.
The game presented in this chapter is one possible way to modelling
this perturbation Rubinsteinthe with and strictlyto game,
seen,
a unique "bargaining outcome", which ishas different from thevery
Rubinstein Thus, the Rubinstein
is not stable in the presence of small perturbations of this
type.
Finally, notion inshall the ofcommentwe on
bargaining. Since there does not exist
isnotion in bargaining need fordefined thereof a
exploring the various plausible notions that come to the mind.
this version ofgeneralisedchapter modelledhaveIn we a
bargainers takeSchelling's thatnotion commitment, which is,of
Here,
revocable, but at a cost.
i
actions during the negotiation process to increase the future cost of 








positive but very small (i.e., negligible). As we have
case that the Rubinstein
"bargaining






Commitment, whatmodelled in this chapter, does havenotas we





rolehas play in the notion of commitment thattono
this chapter.
notion of commitment isthe model a
infinite-time perfectsequential with complete andgame
information.
c h apt e r making commitmentthatIn toa a
costs of revoking a commitment.
commitfor which he willchooses, strategically, the length of time
himself to a bargaining position. the length ofThe costs depend on
time costs being strictly increasing and strictly inchosen; convex
is irrevocable time thattime. Commitment during the length of a
ischosen commit himself. commitmentbargainer has Thus,to
genuine unconditionala demand (i.e.,irrevocable la Nash game ” a
committake-it-or-leave-it only if bargaineroffer) chooses toa
himself for an infinite length of time.
commitment is costly.
is adopted in







In chapter 2 we
costly, but there are no
in bargaining;
horizon
shall present a model that explores
non-cooperative
a bargainer can make a 
in principle,  for any length of time.
costs associated with the length of time for which 
(for example, no lawyer's fees to be paid, 











































This chapter, together with examines role of1, the
In this chapter we shall present a
model notion of commitment in bargaining differenta
from the notion explored in chapter 1.
this chapter the basic ideaIn is, that making commitment to aa
bargaining position is costly, but revoking a commitment is costless
(for motivation of this idea ideachapter 1, pp.24-25). Thisa see
will formalisedbe in non-cooperative infinite-time horizona
sequential game with complete and perfect information.
The players make offers alternately. At the time of making an offer
a player can choose, strategically, the length of time for which he is
committed his offer. Commitment during that length of time isto
irrevocable. The cost of making a commitment depends on the length of
time which Commitmentfor commitment offer is sought. isto an
irrevocable a genuine unconditionalla demand (i.e.,ttgame a
bargainertake-it-or-leave-it if chooses commitoffer) only toa
himself for an infinite length of time.
The game may be interpreted as a generalisation of the alternating-
offers model of Rubinstein (1982), in which the proposer has available
namely the length of time for which he isan extra strategic variable,
This implies that the "times" at which offerscommitted to his offer. !
except the first offer whichdetermined endogenously,are
is made at time t=0.
unique sub-game perfectexistence ofthesection 3In aprovewe
equilibrium.
obtainedRubinstein (1982) solution isthethe equilibrium,In
commit themselves) ifplayer Bneither player A(i.e., evernor
conditions relativelymadeThesehold.conditionscertain are
tends to zero. Then,
chapter 
commitment in bilateral bargaining, 
that explores
transparent if the exogenously fixed minimum time between successive 
offers - which represents the physical constraints in making an offer 














r^  is the rate of time preference of player i(r£>0)
C£(T) is the cost to player i for making a commitment for a length of 
time T. ^ is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function with 
/CjL(0)=0  0^(0) >0 . The right-hand side of the inequality above is 
interpreted as the marginal benefit to player i if player i 
himself. Thus, in the equilibrium, the Rubinstein solution is obtained 
at the margin, the cost to both players of committing themselves 









time for to aan
determined endogenously,The which offers madeat areare
is madeexcept the first offer which at
(i.e.,makes an offer
which is committed his his (i.e., thehe offer, andto
either (i.e., waitsresponder) concedes accepts) toor
make a counteroffer,
length of time, namely the length of time for which the proposer has
committed himself plus fixed minimum time whichan




has available an extra strategic variable,
offers.
(n=0,1,2, . . .) , player A makes offer,timeAt an
time, whereand anda
concedesPlayer B either Ifor
I
game may be interpreted 
offers model of Rubinstein
length of time above the exogenously fixed minimum time 
proposer has committed himself to his offer); A, Te .
a player can choose, 
committed  his offer.
exogenously 
represents the physical constraints in making a counteroffer.
player who makes an offer)









which the responder can make only after a certain
The player who 





a pie ofTwo players, , are bargaining on the partition of 
size one. The pie will be partitioned only after the players reach an
The players make offers alternately. At the time of making an offer 
strategically, the length of time for which he is 
Commitment during that length of time is 
The cost of making a commitment depends on the length of 
which commitment   offer is sought. Thus, making 
commitment is costly, but revoking a commitment is costless.
for which a
The bargaining process 
time horizon sequential game with complete and perfect 
a generalisation of the alternating- 
(1982), in which the proposer
Let A denote the exogenously fixed minimum time between successive






point where player A has toa
t=0begins time with player choosingThe Aatgame
shall that the LetWe assume
(i=A,B) denote the Letrate
be and convexa










k=[(n-2)/2] the payoff,Thusand if iseven)n





















Player A either concedes or rejects.
Rejection leads the game to 
2n+2E (T•)+(2n+2)A.i=l
On the other hand, 
2n+l t= E i=l
j=l to player A is:
a move.
offer which is the accepted
___k _ ★ ___  v where k=n
( E1(T^) + (2i)A)], 
j=l -J
n-1 * k *
exp [-rA ((T j) + (n-1) A) ] “i^ocA (T2i+l> exP
players maximise expected utility.
rj_     of time preference of player i.
c^: ]R+—>1R+(i=A, B)   strictly increasing  strictly 
/function with 0^(0)=0 and C£<0)>0. c^CT) denotes the cost to player i 
for making a commitment for a length of time T.
come to an agreement.
where k=[(n-l)/2] if n is odd, and k=[(n-2)/2] if n is even. One can, 
similarly, define the payoff to player B.
2n+2 
the game. 
move, at time t
players agree
is the share of surplus received by player A and 1-x 
the share of surplus received by player B. Let (t£,...,T*) denote the 
commitment times chosen by the two players up until time t*, when they
* n-1 *t = E (T-) + (n-l)A.  n is odd, then it j=l -I 
is the accepted offer.
is player B's 
offer. The commitment times of player A are (T£,T^,...,T£), 
if n is odd, and k=n-l if n is n. The time at which player A chose 
the commitment time T^+i (i=0,1, . . ., k, where k=[(n-l)/2] if n is odd, 
is   (Tj) + (2i)A.
2n+lAt time t= E (T•)+(2n+l)A, i=l 
chooses a commitment
(n=0,1,2,...), player B makes an offer, 
where xOnxOe[0,l] and
if player Bthen the game ends.
rejects,  game proceeds at time . ^ (T^) + (2n+l) A, where 
player B makes e. Note that if player B rejects, then he has to 
wait for  time, of length T2n+1+^' before making  . Nothing 










is thewe usestrategy. The solution concept  will    sub-game perfect 
equilibrium (SGPE) (Selten (1965, 1975)). A strategy tuple is in SGPE 
if its restriction to any subgame is in Nash equilibrium.
I
the bargaining game 
game of complete information 
common knowledge amongst the players). 
note that G is a game of perfect information.
shall be denoted by G, 
information is assumed to be
is a
A strategy for each agent 
make at each and every 
two players will have
in G will tell the agent the 
decision node that he may be . Each of the 





istime which hethe for
SGPE G; to
(1987b) (Thm. (1987b)1 a
restatement of Rubinstein's (1982) result).
PROPOSITION.












(1) and (2), above,of(i) TheREMARKS: are









The game G that we have presented (in section 2) may be interpreted 
generalisation of the alternating-offers model 
in which the proposer has available
B (s) 1
(x*,t ★., S )







, * * (y /S
as nothing more than a 
of Rubinstein (1982),
accepts any proposal 
★ ★ ★ the proposal y , s (
rejects any proposal which is strictly worse for him than the proposal 
(x*,t*)- where (x*,t*), (y*,s*) are defined above.
strategic variable, namely 
committed to his offer. The Proposition below deals with the existence 
and the uniqueness of the  of the game  it is analogous 
Theorem 1 in Rubinstein    of Rubinstein  is
the unique SGPE of the game G is the pair of strategies in 
which player A (player B) always makes the offer x*(y*) and commits 




(ii) One can verify that the pair of strategies described 
in the Proposition are in SGPE. (iii) Lemmas (1) and (2) below prove 
* ★ ★ *the existence of a unique solution (x ,t ,y ,s ) to the two programmes
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of the SGPE of
(see his Proof 1 of Theorem 1)
method of proof presented by Shaked and Suttonon
(1984a) .
Lemma 1.
Consider the two in(1) and (2) , described theprogrammes f
Proposition, above.












































described in the Proposition.
SGPE of our game G is not presented here, 
proof  uniqueness of 
presented in Rubinstein (1987b) 
is based  the
(1=1,3), and f^zS—>3R+ 
y=f (x, t) 
s=f2<x't)
(iv) The proof of the uniqueness of the 










Let examine (1) (cf. the Proposition). Substitutingus
[ 1-[x-cA(t)]exp[-rA(A+s)]-cB(s)] .max
(s) .
(t)>0 and Thus is
strictly concave,
s=0 if F (0)<0
s>0 if F (0)>0
F (0)>0, first-orderIf is condition (i.e.,then s
F (s)=0) . exists isthereHence, a
as defined in the Lemma.
constraint ofSubstituting into the (Dr we
where y=fi(x,t)
(2) and show the existence of the
3
Q.E.D.
















obtain that there exists
where f2
One can similarly solve programme 
functions fq as defined in the Lemma.
CA(°)
rB H-y-CB 3 exP [-rB <A+t> ] =c
F : —>3R.|.
denote it by s.
cB(s)>0, 
and hence a unique solution exists;
programme 
a function, say f^zS—>[0,1], 
is as defined in the Lemma.
programme 
for the constraint, we obtain:
Let F(s) denote the maximand. Differentiating twice, we obtain:
F (s)=rA[x-cA(t)]exp[-rA(A+s)]-cB(s) and
F (s)=-rA[x-cA(t)]exp[-rA(A+s)]-cB









Hence, have under the conditions specifiedwe a
above for Case I,
for i^j,i,j=A,B,



















y =[exp(-rAA)] [ [1-exp(-rBA)]/[ 1-exp(-A(rA+rB) ) ] ]




(x*, t ,y*,s*) to equations (3),
Solving the above equations,
x*=[l-exp(-rBA)]/[1-exp(-A(rA+rB))] 
t*-0
* , , .......... _ . ...
c± (0) > [r jexp (-r jA) [1-exp (-r^) ] ] / [1-exp(-A(r±+rj) ) ] .
Case I:
rBA)<cA(0).
There exists a unique solution 
(5) and (6) of Lemma 1.
no explicit solution will be obtained. However, 
using the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem and the Gale-Nakaido Univalence 
Theorem, one can prove the existence and the uniqueness of a solution 
(6) .
rB[l-y-cB(s)]exp(-
★ * _ s =t =0
interesting conclusion is brought out by the result of Case 
in Lemma 2. The result is the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining solution,
unlike Case I






for i^j , i,j=A,B, (10)
Note that
a
(i=A,B) and the rates






























at the margin, 





j. To restate, 
if condition
is the share of the surplus received by player 
commitment is never made by either player A or player B 
(10) holds. Condition (10) establishes  "relationship"
In order to obtain a more transparent interpretation let A—»0 .
★ Ar Arx =y =rB/(rA+rB) and s =t =0 (i.e., the Rubinstein result) if
our game G has produced the Rubinstein result if.
rj[ri/(r±+rj)] 
inequality (10)) can be interpreted 
player i (when player i and player j have not committed themselves for 
any length of time,  given s*=t*=0) . r^/ (r^+rj) is the share of 
the cake (i.e., surplus) received by player j j is player 
rate of time preference. When player i commits himself, 
the amount of cake he has to give to player j, 
decreases - and thus player i's share increases - and the amount 
by which it decreases depends on the rate of time preference of player 
j (i.e., rj) and, of  what player j receives if he rejects - 
which is .;  .-+r4  Hence, MB=r j [r^/(r^+r j) ] .
(10) by reference to some 
is very small (say, approximately equal 
Then the MB to player i is approximately equal 
that player j is very patient, which in 
implies that player j does not care when he receives ^ r^+rj) , 
in turn implies that player i cannot gain by committing himself, 
the margin (i.e., MB~0) . (ii) Suppose rj is very large (say,
approximately infinite,  rj~°°) . This means that player j is very 
impatient, which in turn implies that player j cares a lot as to when 
he receives r^/fr^+rj), which in turn implies that player i can gain a 













the bilateral bargaining problem the perfectusing notion of a
equilibrium in bargaining process. of the twoa
players in the bilateral quitbargaining situation is free to
bargaining outsideand instead outside option; thetake up some
option is available with certainty. The outside option and the pie
"How will the value of the
the bargaining outcome?” Binmore (1985),
using an extension of the Rubinstein bargaining model, demonstrated
that if the value of the outside option is less than what the player
receives in the Rubinstein solution then it will the
other hand, the value ofbargaining outcome, and the if theon
thethan what the player receives inoutside is largeroption
does influence thesolution then the outside optionRubinstein
his opponent buys him out by giving him thebargaining outcome
the ‘OutsideThis result is knownvalue of the outside option. as
(1984b) further(see forPrinciple’ Shaked and SuttonOption a
discussion).
of the two players in the bilateral bargainingNow suppose one
situation is free to quit bargaining and instead take up some outside
But, now the outside option is not available with certainty;option.
the player has to engage in
In other words, the player is free to quitfind this outside option.
bargaining in order to search for his outside option. If the player
the outside option, after having searched fornot finddoes some
time, then he may resume bargaining. In this situation, how will the
a process of random search in order to
outside option impinge on
under bargaining are mutually exclusive.
Now suppose one
not influence
In his classic paper, Rubinstein (1982) presented a solution to
li
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value of the outside option impinge on the bargaining outcome, given
that search is costly.
The chapterpresent will provide the abovetoan answer
question. fact,In in this chapter will study generalwe a more
situation; each of the two players is free to quit bargaining and
instead engage in a process of random search in order to find one of
his many outside options. The players may
time without success.
interested to know how the values of the outside options impinge on
the bargaining outcome, given that search is costly.
Thus, this chapterin study the following situation. Twowe
players are bargaining on the partition of a pie of size The pieone.
will be partitioned only after the players reach an agreement. Each
of the two players is free to quit bargaining and instead engage in a
process of random search in order to find
options, which the player may adopt instead of attempting to reach
an agreement in the bargaining (i.e., the outside options and the pie
under bargaining are mutually exclusive). The players can choose to
having searchedbargaining, for withoutafter timesomeresume
success.
And the worker is free to
quit bargaining in order to search for alternative wage offers.
in section 2, which ismodel,
infinite-time horizon sequential game with complete information. The
bargaining and both ofsearch,incorporates two processes,game
The bargaining process is the alternating-which depend time.on
by Stahl (1972) and (1982).Rubinsteinoffers procedure studied
I
An example of such a situation is when two insiders, a firm and a
resume bargaining, after
Once again, we arehaving searched for some
one of his many outside
worker, are bargaining over the wage.
We present a a non-cooperative
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Furthermore, the game incorporates a
and search processes ought to be interlaced.
3section the subgame perfect equilibrium solutionIn we use
concept (Selten (1965, 1975)) to analyse the game, and we
unique equilibrium partition. We then analyse the limiting
the time between successive There
important reasons why is interested in this limit. Firstly, thisone
eliminates the first And secondly, this overcomes
the criticism that is often made regarding the rigidity of the
timetable for making proposals; these points were first discussed by
Binmore (1987a).
Suppose the players did not play the then each playergame;
would achieve his expected reservation value, which is derived from
sequentially optimal search rule over his outside options.
discussion of optimal stopping rules).
Before we state the key result that is obtained,
’Outside Option Principle’ extendsBinmore (1985)
withoutside availablehas optionthe playerseach of two one
exist mutuallyorder for thereinthan tooptions is less one,
beneficial trade amongst the two players.
The key result is, that in the limiting case we obtain the Binmore
players’Principle’, expectedwith the(1985) ’Outside Option
reservation values treated as the outside options.
An alternative angle from which to view this result is as follows.
result (thepresented in this chapter has producedThe agame
(1985)produced by the Binmorewould belimiting case) that
extension of the Rubinstein game (which produced the ’Outside Option
(See McCall (1965) for a
’’view”
following a
we note that the
case as
mover advantage.
on how the bargaining
obtain a
to the case when
offers tends to zero. are two
certainty; of course, one assumes that the sum of the two outside
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priori define the expected
reservation values of the players to be their outside options available
with certainty.




Two players, A and B, pie of
size one. The pie will be partitioned only after the players reach an
Player k (k B) is freeagreement. quit bargaining andA, to
process of random search in order to find
outside options, which the player may adopt instead of
attempting to reach agreement in the bargaining (i.e., the outsidean
options and the pie under bargaining are mutually exclusive). Denote
the outside options by
(i = 1, ..., N^) with
x< 1).
horizon sequential
with complete information. The incorporates twogame game
search, both of which dependbargaining andprocesses,
The bargaining process is the alternating-offers procedure studied
(1982).(1972) searchRubinstein The isby Stahl and process
interlaced with the bargaining process as follows. At any time in the
bargaining process when player A makes an offer to player B, B can,
reject the offer and makeeither accept the offer, aor
counteroffer (and thus remain on the negotiating table), or reject the
offer and leave the negotiating table (i.e., the bargaining process) in
At the end of one period oforder to search for an outside option.
search either an outside option is taken up, in which the gamecase
the players return to the negotiating table with B making
And symmetrically, following B’s offer to A,an offer to A. A can
choose to interrupt the bargaining process in order to search for an
1





probability p^ (1 > p^ > 0 and




that the options are ordered (i.e.
are bargaining on the partition of a
ends, or
(i = 1, N^, 1 > x¥ > 0), and assume
The model is a






outside option. Note, either the
ends, else the bargaining is resumed; in other words,game or
following interruption of the bargaining and thenan process, an
H unsuccessful” search period, the game proceeds to another round of
bargaining and not to another round of search.
We may now proceed to
offer to player B (point (1) inAt time t - 0, player A makes an
1Figure 1). either accept the offer, in which
game ends, B has to wait A units
of time to make counteroffer, reject the offer anda or
negotiating table (i.e., the bargaining process) in order to search for
an outside option.
If player B chooses, at time 0, to search fort
option, then player A has to decide whether to or not to search for
outside option (point (2) in Figure 1). One period of search takesan
T units of time.
Then, at time t = T, a chanceSuppose player A does not search.
player B findsmove occurs
and with probability (1 -
thewhichin returns tooutside option,findnot casean
negotiating table and makes an offer to A (point (4)). If B finds
the outside option x? he either chooses to take it, in which case
i
chooses not to take it, in which case B returns tothe game ends, or
the negotiating table and makes an offer to A (point (4)).
Suppose player A chooses to search.
Figure 1 is placed at the end of section 4.1.
i
the outside option x?,
Then, at time t = T, a
a description of the game.
Player B can case the
or reject the offer, in which case
an outside
that after one period of search,
leave the
(point (3)), in which, with probability p?
nb 1






with probability [1 - i
outside option, in which
choose either
E p?]p4 player A finds the outside option and player B doesi
an
take it and thus the game ends or not to take it and thus B makes
playeroffer to A (point (6)), and (iv) with probability p?pan
If both players donot to take up their respective outside option.
not take up their respective outside option, then B makes an offer to
A (point (6)).
outside option, then the game ends.
If at time t = 0 player B chose to search, then atTo summarise.
round) either the game has endedtime t - T (after searching for one
the players have returned to the negotiating table with B makingor
On the other hand, if at time t = 0 player B choseoffer to A.an
not to search and simply waited to make counteroffer, then at timea
t = A B makes an offer to A.
player B begins bysubgame in whichtheWe describenow
making to player A.
independent of the history of the subgame. Let us denote the game
in which B begins with
Therefore, the game at time t = 0 is G^,begins with an offer by G^.












A finds the outside option xA and player B finds the outside option
J
, in which case both players, simultaneously, decide whether to or
J - - ■ ' XJ
outside option, in which case A has to choose either to
an offer by Gg, and the game in which A
to take it and thus the game ends or not to take it
chance move occurs (point (5)), in which, (i) with probability
NB n NA a
E P-] [1 ~ E P-] both players, A and B, do not find an
i=l 1 j=l J
outside option, in which case B makes an offer to A (point (6)), (ii) 
NA
E pA]p? player B finds the outside option : 
j=l J
and player A does not find an
an offer
or both A andor B B take up their








and the subgame at time t - A and the subgames at time t ~ t (when
B makes an offer) is Gg.
We have described, above, the game G^. Repeat that description,
but with A replaced by B and B replaced by A, and one obtains the
description of the game Gg. To summarise. If at time t - T (t - A) A
chose to search, then at time t 2r(t - A + t) (after searching for
one round) either the game has ended the players have returnedor
to the negotiating table with A making On the other
hand, if at time t - T(t = A) A chose not to search and simply waited
to make a counteroffer, then at time t = T + A (t = 2A) A makes an
offer to B.
Thus, at times 2A,t 2t (whent + A and tT
player A makes offer to player B) the game has returned to thean
game G^. Hence, note the recursive structure of the game G^ that
begins at time 0; the homogeneity of the game permitst
define and independently theGB of time elapsed since the
beginning of the game.
We shall that the two players maximise expected utility.assume
Player k (k = A, B) has Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
Uk (z, t, m) = z
by player k, if agreement on the partition is achieved,
of an outside option belonging to player k, if k takes up an outside
(w
A, B) takes up an outside option leaving player k with his
The expected reservation value is theexpected reservation value.
expected payoff derived from following a sequentially optimal search
t is the time elapsed from time t 0rule over outside options.
is the number of periods that player k
i
ga
option, or the expected reservation value of player k, if player w
z can be either the share of the pie received
a von
an offer to B.
or the value
before z is obtained, and m





searched is obtained. the (common) discount factor8 is
(i.e., the cost of time), 0 < 8 < 1, and & represents
period of search, 0 < 3 < 1. We shall assume that the total cost of
search per period of search includes the cost of time (the r units of
time incurred) and the fixed cost per period of search.
shallWe that the GA is completeofassume game gamea
information, i.e., all information (including and thetree
players preferences) is assumed to be common knowledge amongst the
players. game of imperfect information. The
imperfect information arises only in the search process, when both of
the players find an outside option and have to decide simultaneously
(i.e., without knowing what decision the opponent is taking) whether
to or not to take up their respective outside option. We emphasize
nowhere else thethat in does there exist imperfectgame
We note that this imperfect information is innocuous ininformation.
that the subgame perfect equilibrium solution concept is sufficient
(and necessary) to ensure
Suppose player k (k = A, B) refused to play the game Gy^ with
= A, B); then player k would achieve his expected(w * k, w
derived from followingreservation value (ERV), R^,
Thereoptimal search rule over outside options. Let us compute Rm­
will exist r^ such that it is sequentially optimal for player k to
for i > r^, and to reject outside optionsaccept outside options x











We note that Gy^




a fixed cost per
> x -j rk-l
is a
i.e., there exists r^ such that
a sequentially
before z





discussion of optimal stopping rules). rk
for i = 1, N^, S, T and /3.
Given R^ is defined as follows:
/ 1 " 1 -
A strategy for each agent in will tell the agent the choice to
make at each and every decision node that he may be at. Each of
set of strategies from which to choose a
is the subgame perfectstrategy.
equilibrium (SGPE) (Selten (1965, 1975)). A strategy tuple is in SGPE











will depend on the parameters p^,
(see McCall (1965) for a
xk
i
the two players will have a
Rk





will analyse the using the solutionWe SGPEgamenow
firstly, in characterise theWe unique SGPEconcept. Case I,
partition of the game when player A has no outside option and player
B has one outside option. This will elucidate the
result of this chapter and allow to draw certain conclusions. Weus
will not present the analysis of the game G^ when player A has many
outside options and player hasB
because the algebra involved is extremely complicated and lengthy, to
say the least. secondly, in Case II, prove the existence
SGPE partition (and characterise it)and uniqueness the whenof
(say N)outside option and player hasBno many
outside options. the existence and
uniqueness of the SGPE partition (and characterise it) when player A
has one outside option and player B has one outside option.
Player A hasCase I:
outside option.
And player B’s ERV, Rg, is as follows:
[ST/?px]/[l - (1-p)8T/3] ,
(cf. section 2). dropped the subscripts andthat haveNote we
has onlysuperscripts, since outside option andhas BA no one
p denotes the probabilityoutside option; this reduces the notation.
period ofhis inthat will find outside optionB search.onex
Furthermore, note that Rg < 1 for all values 0<S<l,T>0, 0</3<
gA
Player A’s ERV is zero.
rb
However, we
no outside option and player B has one
crux of the main
Thirdly, in Case III, we prove




1, 0 < p < 1 and 0 < x 1.
for all possible parameter values. ra + 1 implies that there<
mutually advantageous trade, i.e., a surplus exists.
The game has a unique SGPE partition, in which agreement is
reached at time t - 0 and player A receives share M, given by:
1/(1ifM
0] if
and player receives (The above result is obtained byB 1 M.
putting N 1 in Proposition 1, which will be stated and proved
below, in Case II.)
A relatively transparent interpretation is made possible by taking
the limit as A-*0.
Firstly, this eliminates the first
mover advantage. And secondly, this overcomes the criticism that is
often made regarding the rigidity of the timetable for making
proposals (i.e., after rejecting an offer and choosing not to search a
player will typically wish to make his counteroffer at the earliest
possible and thus the limiting be usedmoment, case can as a
paradigm which thethe in players formallyfor notcase are
exogenously determined timetable). These points
first discussed by Binmore (1987a). Thus as A ->0, we obtain:were
1/2if1/2M








+ >z [ST/?px] / [SA
+ px]]/[1 - (l-p)ST+A
rb
why one is interested in this limit.
constrained by an
But, there are two further and important reasons
- 0, R^ + Rg < 1 is satisfied
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where Rg is the expected reservation value (ERV) of player B.
the outside option to player B available withIf one treats Rg as
(as A-»0)in the rediscovered thethen limit havecertainty, we
Principle’.'Outside Option The principle first discovered bywas
Principle’ ('OOP’)(1985). 'Outside beThe OptionBinmore can
outside option and playerobtained in our game when player A has no
outside option available with certainty, and thus B does
not have to search for his outside option (or equivalently, t = 0, /3 =
The 'OOP’ (limiting case,1 and p = 1).
1/2 ifM
if1-x
where x is the outside option of player B available with certainty.
The 'OOP’ refers to the situation when player B has
option x, available with certainty. Now suppose B has to search for
his outside option
presented game which incorporates the bargaining and the searcha
processes; in particular, the game represents as to how thea
bargaining process ought to be interlaced with the search process.
led the conclusion that it is the value thatto not
it does in the case when
available with certainty, but it is of thatrb matters.
Furthermore, Rg influences the bargaining outcome as if Rg were the
outside option of player B available with certainty.








influences the bargaining outcome, as
an outside
B has one
x and that search is costly.
of x






(say N) outside options.
And, player B’s ERV, Rg, is as follows:
1 -
(cf. section 2). subscripts andNote
superscripts, since A does not have any outside option; this reduces
the notation. Pi (i = 1, ..., N) denotes the probability that B will find
May we recall (fromhis outside option x^ in period of search.one
section 2) that there exists r such that
Furthermore, < 1 for all parameter values. Thus, R^ +
0.
The SGPE of the game Ga is analysed using the elegant method
proposed by Shaked and Sutton (1984a).
We begin by establishing the following:
Let Pa(ga) den°te the set of SGPE payoffs to player ALemma 1:
Let M denote the supremum (infimum) of Pa(ga)‘the game Ga*in
Then:















- S^M), f] ,
X r
< 1 since Rarb
p. X .
1 1
piPiXi / 1 "
note that Rg
Player A’s ERV is zero.
rb
pi pi
(1 - S^M) +
Player A has no outside option and player B has many
max (x^., 1 -







Let Pa/G/J denote the set of SGPE payoffs to player A inProof:
the game and let M denote the supremum of Pa(Ga>«
In Figure 1, consider the subgame beginning from point (7), at
which player A choose either to search (i.e.,can
counteroffer (i.e., move to pointnot to search and wait to makeor a
(9)). Player does have outside option, thus theA andnot an
of the payoff in perfect equilibrium of theto Asupremum any
subgame beginning at point (7) is S^M.
consider the subgame beginning at point (10),Now where B
makes Any offer by B which gives A
will be accepted by A; and perfect equilibrium inso
which B offers It follows that B will get at least 1 -
fact, this is the infimum of the payoff received by B in the
subgame beginning from point (10).
By repeating the above the infimum of the payoffargument,
received by in the subgame beginning from point (4)B and the
subgame beginning from point (6) is 1 -
Now consider the subgame beginning from point (3), at which B
probability 1 B does not find SupposePi
If he takes it up, then B
receives at least and if he does not take it up, then B moves to
point (4) and receives at least 1 - Thus, the infimum of the
payoff to B in any perfect equilibrium of the subgame beginning from
point (3) if he finds is Thus the infimum of the
payoff to B in any perfect equilibrium of the subgame beginning from
in
max(xp 1 - S^M).xi
an outside option.
an offer to A.
more than S^M.




B finds the outside option x^ (i = 1, N).
more than







In Figure 1, consider the subgame beginning from point (11), at
which search ThehasB to to notor
infimum of the payoff to B in any perfect equilibrium of the subgame
beginning from point (11) is H, where
(2)H F
where 1 1F
beginning from point (1), at whichthe Agame
makes an offer to B. Any offer by A which gives B less than H will
be rejected by B; and so there is no perfect equilibrium in which A
It follows that A will get at most 1 - H; this isoffers less than H.
the supremum of the payoff to A in the game beginning from point
H, where H is defined by equation (2) above.(1). 1Hence, M
Hence the equation shown in Lemma 2 (i.e., equation (1)) defines the
supremum of P/x/G^).
The above argument
may be repeated exactly, but with M defined instead as the infimum
more/less, most/least,pa(ga); with the wordsandof
supremum/infimum and accept/reject interchanged throughout. Hence





















(1 - S^M) +
(1 - S2^) +
We defined M as the supremum of Pa^a)*
max ^$^(1 - t
Pi
Now consider




Before we characterise the solution of the game
the following assumption: t > A (i.e., the time of one period of search
is greater than or equal to the time of one period of bargaining).
SGPE partition, inProposition The unique1: game
which agreement is reached at t = 0, and player A receives share M,
given by:
A4 1/(1 + (ii) thereif either (i)M or
.., N} such that
and
A p,)ST/3P-x- / Si i i
Aor (iii) >z 1/(1 + and
A - (1 “/P4*1 i
-1 1 / 1 " 1 - S+
e {1, 2, 3, .N} such thatif






















































there exists an m
N






and player B receives 1 - M.
We begin by showing that the equation stated in Lemma 1Proof:
(i.e., equation (1)) has unique solution. Leta
considering threesolved byequation for The equation isM.
(ii) 1 - < xj, andxN 4 1 -(i)mutually exclusive cases,
e {2, 3, N} such that xm_q 4 1- 4(iii) there exists an m
Thus, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N, max(x., 1 -< 1 -(i)
Therefore, equation (1) becomes, M - 1
Thus, > ST.ST/?(1 - SaM)}. We have assumed that T > A. Hence,
1 - S^(l - S^M); and therefore,M
1/(1 + SA) . (3)if 4M






































Thus, for i = 1, 2, N, max (x^, 1 - S^M)





1 - E 
i=l
T N




/ 1 " 11 -
A 1/ 1 "(1 - £ ) + £if
(4)1and
there exists an m c {2, 3, ..., N} such that 4
Equation (1) becomes, M = 1 max
(11
Thus,
A£ ) if there existsM
.A< 1/(1 + £ ) < and
AA1/(1 + S ) >/ / *
,T / 1 "11 - £ /3 +
there exists an m e {2, 3, .N} such thatif
A
/ 1 - 1 - £(!-£)+£ P-;P;x m-1i i i
























































































1 - E 
i=m












Combining equations (3), (4) and (5) gives
(1) for M, which is as stated in the Proposition.
Thus, the equation stated in Lemma 1 does indeed have a unique
whence it follows that the supremum and infimum of thesolution
set Pa(G/\) coincide.
is in factthis solutionshow thatstraightforwardisIt to
supported by a pair of strategies which involve immediate agreement
This follows from the fact that M R^ - 0 and 1 M0.at time t
Player A receives M as defined in the Proposition and player>z RB.
B receives 1 M.
Hence, the game has a unique SGPE partition.
Q.E.D.
We discussed theLet us now examine the limiting case, as A -» 0.
0,underfor doing Case I.soreasons
Proposition 1:
either (i) < 1/2 or (ii) there exists anif= 1/2M
ande {2, 3, N} such thatm
1/2 Em
(6)> 1/2 andor
there exists an m € {1, 2, 3, .N} such thatif
and 1/2 < E> xm-1 m
(7)= 0) »
I
1 - E m
x m
4 1/2 < x mx i m-1
(iii) x1




(where we define x^
As A we obtain, from
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/ 1 " 1 -where
interpret the above limiting
through a few points.
withFirstly, that if player B refused to play thenote game
player A, would achieve his expectedthen he reservation value,
denoted by Rg, which is derived from following a sequentially optimal
Thus, there would existsearch rule
that
(8)>/
i.e., player B would accept outside options Xj > and reject outside
would dependoptions Xj xr-l* the values of the parametersr on
for i 1, ..., N, S, t and /3. Rg is defined as follows:Pi,
T/ 1 - 1 -
which has emerged in the limiting case,
is the expected payoff to player B if B followed search rule sucha
that he accepted outside options > and rejected outside options
xi xm-l*












































Secondly, note that Em,
over outside options.









Thus, from equations (8) and (9), we have,
1Vm r
(ID1i. e. , Vm 4r
And from equations (8) and (10), we have,
Vm r + 1
(12)i. e. , Vm r + 1 >/
(13)and Vm r
Fourthly, we have that
(14)
The
second equation of the limiting case, i.e., equation (7), is:
there exists an me {1, 2, 3, N) such thatifM
= 0)(where we defineand> xm-1
1.Using equation (11) we
And, using equations (13) and (14), we haverule out m > r + 1.
























p. x. , 
i 1
E , mx i m-1
rule out m 4 r Using equation (12) we





equation of the limiting case boils down to:
if 1/2 < Rg .M
condition for M(Note that we have not included Rg > xr-l
cf.since it is always true given the properties of1 rb> r,
equations (13) and (14) above.)
The first equation of the limiting case, i.e., equation (6), is:
either (i) (ii) there exists an1/2 ifM
and€ {1, 2, 3, N} such that < 1/2 <ID
1/2 > EID
(where we define = 0).
Using equation (11) we rule out m < r-1. We now demonstrate that
< 1/2 < 1/2 > E Rg < 1/2Vm > r + 1, and m
(4>). A'/B', A'where andi 1
[A' + C]/[B' + D],B ' 1 - 1 -
8T^3where C and DP-xi^i
m~l,A' x< [1/2]B Since for i = r,x< 1/2































Vm r + 1. FromWe have that, Em_j,«=).
Thus, Vmequation (12) given, Vm > r+1 xm_| > Em.
Thus, Rg < 1/2 => Vmi. e. ,r + 1
< 1/2 <1/2, => Vm > r + 1, E> r + 1 E mm
r
ST/3T [1/2][1/2]. Now,P£X^ < s /3
Thus, Rb < 1/2 .[1/2]
= RB <^> Rb <and< 1/2 <Finally, note that,
1/2.
Hence the second equation of the limiting case, equation (6), boils
down to:
1/2 .if1/2M
as A -> 0, we obtain,IN SUMMARY:
1/21/2 ifM
> 1/2 .if Kb
Player A has one outside option and player B has oneCase III:
outside option.
Player k (k = A, B) has a ERV R^ defined as follows:















+ D) Rg < 1/2 .
we are
rb

























(cf. section 2). have dropped
p denotes the probabilitysuperscripts; this reduces the notation.
that player k will find his outside option in
This simplifies the analysis.we have assumed that p^ - pg Wep.
Rg < 1, so that mutually beneficial trade exists.
is again analysed using the method
proposed by Shaked and Sutton (1984a). We have defined the game
offer to Athe subgame of G^ that begins with B making an
(cf. section 2 and Figure 1). set of SGPE
payoffs to player k (k = A, B) in the game Gj (j = A, B).
We begin by establishing the following:
Let Mk( mH) denote the supremum (infimum) of the setLemma 2:
(a)
(b)andy Z1 z2 x Z1 z2
Equation (15):
X)]]y
if either (i) and and< x < x,










1 - max|8 x,





+ p max(x ,A
> 2^> £[PXB
XA
1 - maxfs^x, [ (1 - p)x









shall assume that the parameters p, x^, xg, S, r and ft take values
------------------ J J' ‘
Pk(Gj), then equations (15)-(18) below are satisfied by, 
m§, zi = m? and (b) x = m^ y = , zi =B 1 A B -- A B 1 A




The SGPE of the game
some subscripts andNote that we





and> x + +
+ (1 - P)
Equation (16): 1 y.
Equation (17):
y) ]}.A ,TX
andeither (i) 4 y and xif 4 y,A
and> £[px > y,
or (iv) and> y
+ p(l - p) max(x , y) + p(l - p)R1 BB
(1 - p)2y]}
y andif either (i)
andor (ii) >/ y





























^Tnr 2- max(S y, S /3[p x
(1 - p)z1
x zx

















2+ (1 - p) z
(1 - p)z2^l > z2





Equation (18): 1 - x
denote the supremum and infimum,the proof below: let S
respectively, of the payoff to player k in any SGPE of the subgame
beginning from point (x), where point (x) denotes the points labelled
in Figure 1.
Let MH(m^) denote the supremum (infimum) of the setProof: J J
Pk(Gj).
In Figure 1, consider the subgame beginning from point (12), at
which (i) with probability p player A finds his outside option x^ and
(ii) with probability (1 - p) player A does not find x&, in which case
A makes an offer to B at point (13). Thus, with probability (1 - p),
Then, theNow suppose player A finds
most A gets by taking his outside option is, of course, x^, and the























_ r -^2 CXliUl W X CH Jk>L X x X L. y P,
if max(x^, M^) = M^, then with probability p, 
and thus with probability p, I?
sA b12
probability p, = 
probability p, S^
For purposes of convenience we will use the following notation in 
k , k x ana Ix
S12 = MA and I^
p max(x , M^) , 
A 
A* 
max(x^, M^). Now if max(x^, M^) = x^, then with






subgame beginning from pointin Figure 1, the
both players, A and B, find(14), at which,
their respective outside option, and xg, (ii) with probability p(l -
(iii) withbut player does findp) player A finds B not XB>XA
probability (1 - p)p player B finds xg but player A does not find x^,
and (iv) with probability (1 - p)2 neither A B finds his outsidenor
option, in which case A makes an offer to B at point (15). Thus,
Now suppose B




Similarly, if A finds xA and B does not find xg, then with probability
(XA» M^), andP(1 “ P), max
if
if
find their respective outsideA andNow suppose both players, B,





































+ p(l - p) max(x , M ) + p(l - p)RAA
if
(21)
p max(x , M ) + (1 - p)M' if < mA
p(l - p)R. + (1 - p)+ BB
if
(22)
) + (1 - p)m‘ if < M‘
In Figure 1, consider the subgame beginning from point (8), at
which B has to choose either to search or not to search. If player B
then he gets at least STI® , where I?chooses not to search, is1212
defined in equation (20) above and ST represents the cost of waiting
(t being the time per period of search). If player B chooses to
is defined in
equation (22) above and ft represents the fixed cost per period of
search.





















(A 2MA (1 - p) ma
jnax(x , 
D
Thus, Ig - inoA<v XI9* w ,_,x14
ill = ST1P9, and thus, = ST/3S6Q, where S^9

















search, then he gets at least where 1^
c rYA















consider the subgame beginning from point (7), whereLet us now
Thus,player A has to choose either to search
(24)
defined in equation (23).
At point (10), in Figure 1, player B makes an offer to player A.
defined above in equation (24)) will be accepted by player A; and so
It
Now












Any offer by player B which gives player A more than (as
mAB
where SA is o













follows that B will get at least 1 - S^; and thus, IBq
max (sV .A
thus = ST^SA where sA 
o 14 14
If, on the other hand, STIB 4 ST/3IB , then IB = ST/3IB , and





rearranging, we obtain that equation (25) is
And note
that equation (26) is equation (16) (which is stated in Lemina 2) with
z2
have shown that equations (15) and (16), which are
stated in Lemma 2, are satisfied by andy Z1 =
z2
By a symmetric argument one can show that equations (17) and (18)
- mAare satisfied by In fact, thex Z1 B
the argument is revealed by the symmetrysymmetry of between
(15) (17), (16) andequation and equation and between equation
equation (18); take equation (15) and interchange y/x, x^/xg,
rb/ra, and
Thus equations (15)—(18) are indeed satisfied by,
Z1
Now, the argument that led us to discover that equations (15) and
(16) are satisfied by y Z1
m-
replaced by
accept/reject, most/least, more/less interchanged throughout. And
Z1
satisfy





















is stated in Lemma 2) with x
one discovers that equations (15) and (16) are satisfied by x =
one obtains equation (17).
= M? and zo =A 4*-
as equation (15) (which




x - M^, y = m|, zj = m®  = M^ may be 




By substituting for S^, using equation (24), and then substituting 
for SA, using equation (23), and then substituting for SA jB $A o 14 14 1Z
and usin& equations (21), (22), (19) and (20), and finally
x - MA yA
= mA y
A
'B “B> **A w, U1A, mA










We now characterise the solution of the game G^.
Proposition 2:
which agreement is reached at t ~ 0, and player A receives the share
x, given by:
A A
1/(1 + * ) either (i)if andx
A
S ) xand B
A
1/(1 + S ) <
A< ocQ/(1 + S ),3
pxD]]/[l - S if either+ B
X< [SA[1 - ST3[(1 - p)and
‘/3(1 - p)] or (ii)
< a SA[1 - 8T/3[(1 - p) + px_]]/[l - £3 B










ra? ’ A A
T+A n i
£(1 - p)J
PX’B] ]/[l - s
y = mg,
> «3/[i + S t
sA)
> 0^/(1 + SA)
and o^/(l + SA) €
x< o^/Q + SA)
> aj/(l *' ®A) and
T+AjB(1 - p)] 4
< a /(I + SA)










z2 ~ and (b) xsatisfied by (a) x
or (iii)
(i) xB
and SA[1 - 8rZ3[(l - p) +
XB
or (ii) «1/(1






unique SGPE partition, inThe game G^ has a





(1 - p)ZT/3]/pST/3where and
> 1), and player B receives 1 - x.
show the thatProof: in appendix the four equationsWe
(15)-(18), which are stated in Lemma 2, have a unique solution. Let
zj, Z2) denote this unique solution. Thus,
1 1y
straightforwardis show that this solutionIt is in factto
supported pair of strategies which involve immediate agreement
0. This follows from the fact thatat t >z RAX
where stated Proposition 2.in Player A receives andx x
player B receives 1 - x.
Hence the game has a unique SGPE partition.
Q.E.D.
interpretation of this result.
look at the limiting case, as A 0. (See Case I where we discuss the
interest and importance of this limiting case). As A -> 0, we obtain:
< 1/2 and < 1/21/2 ifx
I







«,SA[1 - Sa(l - px.ST/S)J/(l - <1 - p)S 
«J A
eA[l - SA[1 - px ,ST/3]]/[l - (1 - p)S
A
- (1 - pjV/i] [1 - (1 - P)STZ3] ]/[ [pST/3] [1 - (1 ~ P)2ST3]],
[1 - (1 - p)sT+A
T+A „, x
■ /3] < X
/3]
ra rb
y = m| =
ai









x = mA =
A
and 1





> 1/2 andif *B
> 1/2 andif
and Rg denote the expected reservation values of player A and
(Note, Lim =player B, respectively. 1A->0
in the limitingagain, case,
reinterpret the notion of the outside
treat and Rg
and player B, respectively.
where R^




< 1 - Rb




and [x ]/[Lim ccj =
A A-,0 °
1 - RB
Rb < 1 - ra ,
Option Principles provided we
option: i.e., we as the outside options of player A
we obtain the *Outside
1
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
2 presented model the following situation.section ofIn we a
the partition of pie of sizea one.
will be partitioned only- players reachThe pie after the an
Each of the two players is free to quit bargaining andagreement.
process of random search in order to find one of
The playershis outside options. choose to resumemany can
situation is when two insiders,
the worker is free toAnd
quit bargaining in order to search for alternative wage offers.
"how will the values of theThe central question of interest is,
outside options impinge on the bargaining outcome, given that search
the analysis the model,From of conducted in 3,section we
to the above question. In the limit,
the time between successive offers tends to zero, the bargainingas
(1985)characterised by the Binmore 'Outsideisoutcome Option
Principle’, with the players’ expected reservation values treated as
the outside options.
The game presented in this chapter, in which derived thewe
above result, explicitly takes into account the search dimension of
the situation that we have modelled. This meant that we have had to
how the searchformulate and bargaininga on processes
In order to model the bargaining situationought to be interlaced.




a firm and a
bargaining, after having searched for some time without success.
An example of such a
is costly?"
instead engage in a
arrived at the following answer
"view"
worker, are
bargaining onTwo players are
some probability) one has to have a model of how




and bargaining interlaced; in
situations, in real life, bargainers have
search in order to find an outside option.
alternative that purports bilateraltogame
bargaining with outside where eachsituation options, option is
available with probability, take of the searchmust accountsome
dimension; which will then require the need to form
the search and bargaining processes ought to be interlaced.
result (the limitingAn interesting observation theconcerning
game is the following. The result becan
obtained in game in which the search
dimension of the situation is completely ignored.
Binmore (1985) extension of the Rubinstein game (which produced the
'Outside Option Principle’). Simply define, priori, the expecteda
reservation values of the players to be their outside options available
with certainty. Then apply the Binmore game and
result (limiting case).
We have made the above observation in order to point out the
"robustness” (1985) ’Outside Principle’,of the OptionBinmore
provided one redefines the notion of We suggest
that the concept of the outside option ought to be redefined
expected reservation value (and




offer available with certainty, the value of his Outside Option equals
the value of his outside offer.
an outside option in the "traditional"
an outside option.




a simpler game; in fact, in a
a player’s Outside Option is his expected payoff
processes are
This game is the
case) produced by our




Thus, in the case when
to engage in some sort of




does not implythe above observationmust emphasize thatWe
dimension of the situation whenshould ignore the searchthat one
attempting to model the bargaining situation.
coincidence that our result (limiting case) be brought out by thecan
The two games are very different.Binmore game.
to model the bilateral bargaining situation with outside options, where
to incorporate theprobability, is
search dimension.
the Binmore game, with the modified
our
game.
The issue is, what is the correct way, if there is
model the interlacing of the bargaining and search processes.
approach this issue is that adopted in theOne currentto
chapter.
bargaining;outside option while he has withdraw from theto
bargaining in order search (seein theto engageprocess
Introduction chapter 5 for that justifies thisto argumentan
approach to modelling the interlacing of the bargaining and search
processes).
alternative approachThe central of modelling theidea toan
interlacing of the bargaining and search processes is the following.
The players can search for an outside option during the bargaining
process, i.e., between two successive offers. This approach was first
explored by Sutton (1986, pp. 713-714). However, he considers the





Finally, we shall now make some comments on an important issue.
case in which each bargainer has only one outside option, available
one could use
However, what we may say
a correct way, to
is, that for purposes
The "right" way
each option is available with some
The basic idea being that a player cannot search for an
definition of an outside option (suggested above) rather than
It happens to be a
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from the result of the current chapter (and thus his result does not
support any modified form of the ’Outside Option Principle’, as does
the result of the current chapter). In chapter 4 we shall generalise
Sutton’s (1986) shall examine the in which thegame; we case
bargainers have many outside options. We shall do this in order to
check ’’robustness”the of the general conclusions obtained by
Sutton.
Wolinsky (1987) also presents
he later embeds in
adopted. Wolinsky, however, generalises the search aspect by letting
the bargainers choose "how hard they wish to search".
Although in the Introduction chapter 5to presentwe an
justify the approach adopted byargument to thein currentus
nchapter the then being embedded large marketin a
context in chapter 5 - it may be the case that there may not be a
conclusive argument to justify either of the two approaches. The
"approaches n be viewed representing differenttwo twomay as
institutional frameworks. Thus, at this stage of our knowledge, there
of modellingis the interlacing of the search andcorrect wayno
bargaining processes.
His
paper subscribes to the approach taken in the current chapter.
2.
recent paper by Shaked (1987).2
It may be noted that the first draft of the current chapter was 
submitted for the University of Cambridge Stevenson prize on 21 
April 1987 (and in fact it was later awarded the Stevenson prize). 
Furthermore, the first draft was written before the papers by 
Shaked (1987) and Wolinsky (1987) appeared.
a bilateral bargaining game (which
a large market) in which the Sutton approach is





Shaked has raised a rather different issue, whichdifferent nature.
however fits within the issues under discussion. The question he
"at which points during the bargaining process shouldaddresses is,
player be allowed to withdraw, in order to search fora
recall, it is the responder who
decides whether continue bargaining. Shakedwithdrawto toor
"Hi-tech"argues that for markets this
He presents a model in which it is thealthough for Bazaars it may.
proposer who decides whether to withdraw or to continue bargaining.
that this issue is important for theLast but not least,
modelling of large markets with sequential bargaining, at thesince
those models lie interlace theheart of howmust toa on
bargaining and search processes.
option?"
"view"
He does not say this explicitly, though, because his concern
a realistic model,may not be
an outside
we note


















































































solve four equations stated in Lemma 2.
Let us firstly simplify equation (15) (stated in Lemma 2). Note
and T > A.
(•, •) and the inequalities, equationAfter manipulating the max
(15) becomes:
either (i)1 if < xy
(iii) x < x andand x orB A
,T1 “ [(1 - p)x + px ]S £ if andA
T+ px ]S /31 - [(1 - p) andifA
(15a)
- (1 - p)ST/3]/pST^ ,where
[(1 - p)[l - (1 - p)STmi - (1 - p)Z3] ]/[Z3p[l - pST -
9 T T T







= [pST£x ]/[l - (1 - p)ST£] 
A
In this appendix we
9 y 
(1 - p) s £]], and
























> 1 and a
A either (i)if x< y1 - S yx B
(iii) y < andand or
andif1
2 and1 - [(1 - p) y + (1 - p)pR if+B
(17a)
equation (17a), above,for inNow secondly, substitute z2we
using equation (16) (stated in Lemma 2) and for in equation (15a)
above, using equation (18) (stated in Lemma 2).
does thissolveAnd finally, for y: onenowone can
carefully, taking note of the parameter restrictions embodied in the
obtained using equations (16) and (18)."inequalities”. arez2























[(1 - p)y +
Z2}




[Note that i cuivx











non-cooperative sequential gameIn chapter 3 presented awe
the playersthat modelled bilateral bargaining whichsituations in
outside option is availablehave many outside options. where each
with probability. We argued there thatsome
»» view” how and bargaining ought to bethe searchon processes
interlaced if In fact, themodels such bargaining situation.one a
presented approach thisin chapter 3 represents togame one
We mentioned there that Sutton (1986, pp. 713-714)important issue.
has presented a game
However,
has only one outside option, available with In this
will generalise Sutton's game;
two players to have many outside options, where each outside option
is available with We do this in order to check the
n robustness" of the general conclusions obtained by Sutton.
Sutton obtains the following result (the limiting when thecase
time between successive offers tends to zero). The outside option
belonging to a player, which is available with probability, doessome
not influence the bargaining outcome if its value is less than the
Rubinstein (1982) solution (i.e., 1/2); if its value is greater than the
Rubinstein solution, then it influences the bargaining outcome
particular way.
show that even if the value of
(available probability)option with is than thegreatersome
Rubinstein solution it need not influence the bargaining outcome.




in which an alternative approach to this issue




he considers the case in which each bargainer
when a
one needs to form a
In this chapter we
____  i3
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options, where each outside option is available with some probability.
influences thethe larger of the outside optionsSuppose two
shall show, that even if the smaller ofbargaining outcome.
Rubinsteinvalue than thethe options hasoutside greatertwo a
the bargaining itinfluence For tosolution it need not outcome.
influence the bargaining outcome its value has to be much greater
than the Rubinstein solution: the precise value required will depend






pie ofTwo players, A and B, are bargaining
The pie will be partitioned only after the players reachsize one. an
Player k (k = A, B) has outside options; denote theagreement.
(i = 1, ..., N^) and assume that the optionsoutside options by 2,
1.... Nk - 1. The outsideare ordered, i.e., for i
is available with probability pk. The bargaining game is1






At each time t = 2n (n = 0, 1, 2, ..., ) player A makes an offer to
player B (node 1 in Figure 1). Player B either accepts or rejects.
If he accepts, then the game ends. Otherwise, a chance move occurs,








in which, with probability p?
xk
Xi+1




(i = 1, 2, .Ng) is available to player B (node 2). If an out­
side option is available then he choose.to B, either to quitcan
not to quit bargaining
counteroffer (node 3).a
Note that with probability (1 - i
to B (node 2), and thus,
offer (node 3).
Following B's offer 2n + 1 (node 3), A either
accepts or rejects. If he accepts, then the game ends. Otherwise, a
(i = 1,2 Na)
(i = 1, 2, ...» N^) is available to A (node 4);the outside option
choose, quit bargaining and takeeither the outsideto up
not to quit bargaining in which case A must await his turn
counteroffer (node 5). The chance
independent.successive nodes are
We shall that the two players maximise expected utility.assume
Player k (k = A, B) has a
be either the share of the pie received byUk(z, t)
player k, if agreement on the partition is achieved,
outside option belonging to player k,an
option, or the expected reservation value of player k, if player
= A, B) takes up an outside option leaving player k with his
expected reservation value. t is the time elapsed from time t 0
S is the (common) discount factor, 0 < S < 1.before z is obtained.
Denote the game described above by G. G is a game of complete
and the agents preferences(i.e., the treeinformation game are









bargaining and take up the outside option, or
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
in which case B must await his turn to make 
nb _
E P?) no outside option is available 
i=l 1
B must await his turn to make a counter­
moves which occur at
w (w
to make a
or the value of
in which, with probability p
z can
to A, at time t






note that G is a game of perfect information.
Suppose player k (k
(w * k,
reservation value (ERV), Rk, sequentiallyderived
Thereoptimal search rule over outside options. Let us compute Rk.
will exist rk such that it is sequentially optimal for player k to
i > rk, and to reject outside optionsforaccept outside options x
such thatfor i rk - 1;
>/ £
discussion of optimal stopping rules).
for i = 1, ..., Nk, and S. We have
follows:
/ 1 - (1 -
We shall assume that R^ < 1, so that mutually beneficial trade is
possible.
A strategy for each agent in G will tell the agent the choice to
make at each and every decision node that he may be at. Each of
set of strategies from which to choose a
will use is the subgame perfectstrategy.
equilibrium (SGPE) (Selten (1965, 1975)). A strategy tuple is in SGPE
























depend on the parameters p^S,





(see McCall (1965) for a
w ~ A, B); then player k would achieve his expected
that, given rk, Rk is defined as
rk will
player w
the two players will have a
Rk
The solution concept we
i.e., there exists rk





The SGPE of the game G is found using the method proposed by
Shaked and Sutton (1984a).
We begin by establishing the following:
Let M be the supremum (infimum) ofLemma: the payoff to A in
any SGPE of G, then:
1 -SIM 1 1 SM
> S(1 - K)if , (r = 1, . . . , N + 1,A
= 1, . . . , N, 1), where 1 - K 1s
1 SM .
Let M be the supremum of the payoff to player A in anyProof:
SGPE of G.
Consider the subgame beginning with an offer made by player A
2 (node 5 in Figure 1). This subgame has the same
structure as the original game G apart from rescaling of payoffs,a
and so the supremum of the payoff to A in any SGPE of this game is
again M.




















A A p. x.
i i
B B p. x.
1 i



















1 none of his outside options
are available.
(if it becomes available), then he must await his turn to make
a counteroffer (at node 5). From the paragraph above
the of the payoff in of the subgameSGPEto Asupremum any
beginning at node 5 is M. Discounted node 4, this equals SM.to
supefrmum of the payoff to A in any SGPE of the subgameThus the
beginning at node 4 is K, where
1K max(SM,SM + that is,
1K ifSM +
(r = 1, ..., N 1) (1)
Now consider the subgame beginning at node 3, where B makes
an offer to A. Any offer by B which gives A than K (where Kmore
is defined in equation (1)) will be accepted by A; and so there is no
SGPE in which B offers than K. It follows that B will get atmore
least 1 K; in fact, this is the infimum of the payoff received by B
in the subgame beginning from node 3.
Now consider the subgame beginning at node 2. At node 2
with probability p?,player B has available his outside option i
and with probability 1 - none of his outside options are
available.
































If B chooses not to take up his outside option x
player A has available his outside option x
xAi
X?i






If A chooses not to take up his outside option
we know that
make aturn tomust await his
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counteroffer (at node 3). infimum of the payoff to BThe
SGPE of the subgame beginning from node 3 is 1 K, where K is
defined in equation (1). Discounted to node 2, this equals 8(1 K).
Thus the infimum of the payoff to B in
beginning from node 2 is L, where
p 8(1 - K) + max (8(1 - K),1L
> 8(1 - K) >P, S(1 " K) if1L
(2)+ 1)(s = 1, . . . , N.B
Now consider node 1 in Figure 1 - the node at which the game G
than L (whereless iswhich gives LAny offer by A Bbegins.
defined in equation (2)) will be rejected by B; and no
It follows that A will get atSGPE in which A offers less than L.
the supremum of the payoff to A inmost 1
beginning from node 1. Hence,
(3)1 - LM
definedK in equation (2), K is inwheresubstitute forNow
equation (1), and then substitute for L in equation (3), where L is
defined in equation (2), and obtain that M iswe
i.e., the equation shown in the Lemma defines the supremumLemma;
of the payoff to player A in any SGPE of the game G.
We defined M as the supremum of the payoff to player A in any



















x i > s-1
Bsi . i . • xp , that is,F B Lpi
so there is
in any
as defined in the
the game








defined instead as the infimum of the payoff to player A in any SGPE
of G; the words more/less, most/least, supremum/infimum
and accept/reject interchanged thethroughout. Hence equation
shown in the Lemma also defines the infimum of the payoff to player
A.
Q.E.D.
We now characterise the solution of the game G.
Proposition: The game G has unique SGPE partition, in whicha
player A receives a share of M, where M is given by:
1M 1 1 * / 1 - 1
1 if > SM > x
> S(1 - K) > (r = 1, . . ., N + 1,A
+ 1),
where
(1 - K) 1 - 1 1 S /
11 1 -























A A p.x.i 1















x i > s-1
A A p.x.i 1
S2
s2
s = 1, .... Nb
B B p.x.1 i





Remark: The game in which player B moves first has
SGPE partition, in which player B receives 1 - K (as defined above in
the Proposition) if
> S(1 - K) >and> SM x + 1,
1) ,= 1, N,s
where is defined above in the Proposition, and playerM Aas
receives K.
We begin by showing that the equation theProof:
preceding Lemma has
Solving that equation for M, and then substituting M into 1 - K,
Thus the equationdefined in the Proposition above.
stated in the preceding Lemma does indeed have
whence it follows that the supremum and infimum of the payoff to
player A in any SGPE of G coincide.
show that this solution is in factstraightforwardis toIt
supported by a pair of strategies which involve immediate agreement
This follows from the assumption that R^ rb < 1,at time t 0. +
Player Awhere R^ (k = A, B) is the reservation value of player k.
defined in the Proposition and player Bthe sharereceives
receives 1 - M.






A x r (r = 1, . . . , Nri
B
X 1 » s-1
a unique solution.
we obtain M as











An implication of the (characterisation) Proposition isRemark:
Suppose the r biggest outside options of player A andthe following.
biggest outside options of player B influence the bargaining
We now ask whether the next biggest outside option of,outcome.
will not influence the bargainingsay, player A (i.e.,
It will not influence the bargaining outcome if the threat ofoutcome.
having recourse to it (if it becomes available) is empty. The threat
will be empty if x
this payoff willthe option;doesA will receive if A not
depend on both the
biggest outside options of player B since these options influence the
is, providedthe bargaining outcome.
this payoff influence theequal toless than notor
bargaining outcome.
the above, is bestcontained in Proposition,The result
interpreted by reference to some special cases.
Player k (k = A, B) has one outside option available withCase I:
probability p (i.e., the Sutton case); then,
x< S/(l + S) (4.1)1/(1 + *) ifM
2[1 - 8(1 - px?)]/[l - (1 - p)8 ] > 8/(1 + 8),if
(4.2)






















is less than or equal to the payoff that player
r biggest outside options of player A and the s
the s











2 2(1 - p) (1 - px?)S]/[l - (1 - p^S*] if
(4.4)> F(x?)
2[1 - pxwhere (i - P)s]/[i - (i - P)s ], k = A, B.
Proof: (cf. the Proposition above). 1 and
1Then, 2 and rP- s
1 and 1 and r 1 givesr
(4.4).
A relatively transparent interpretation is made possible by taking
limiting case: offersa
from 1 to A, replace the probability p by pA, and the discount factor
S by 0 we obtain (see Sutton (1986, pp.Then in the limit A
713-714)) F(x><) 1/2 and:1
(5.1)1/2 v< 1/2ifM
w[l/2] + (1 - w)x (5.2)> 1/2,if x< 1/2
(5.3)< 1/2if > 1/2,+
(1 - w)[x + (1/2)(1 - > 1/2w[l/2] ±1
(5.4)
1/(1 - (p/ln s2)]; (1 - w) can be interpretedwhere w measure
of the likelihood that the outside option will be available.








































2 and r = 2 gives (4.1), s
2 gives (4.3), and, s
change the time interval between successive







availableis withplayer, whichoutside option belonging to a
probability p, does not influence the bargaining outcome if its value
is less than the Rubinstein (1982) solution (i.e., 1/2); if its value is
the bargaining outcomegreater than 1/2, then
particular way (cf. equations (5.1) —(5.4)).
not holdthat this conclusion doesII,In case
each option isoutside options, wherewhen player has twoa
available with some probability.
outside options and player B has twoCase II:
outside options available with probabilities pB and then,1
< S/(l + S) (6.1)1/(1 + S) ifM
> S/(l + S)if
" (5/(1 + *))]and
(6.2)
if
> S/(l + S)
2> s/d + s) + [s p;/(i - (i - p;)s )][x: - (s/d + *))]and (6.3)
(cf. the Proposition above).Proof: 2.
= 3 gives (6.1),


















M B B [1 - P2x2
n B B [! - P2x2 B- d - P2
s = 1 gives (6.3).
(1 - p|)S]/[l - (1 - pB)S2]
“ pB)S]/[i ~ (1 ~ Pg
< S/(l +
Player A has no
Then, s
" px)s J
r_2 B .,.. ,, Bx_2x-.r B
[S P2/d ‘ d “ P2)S J ix2S) +
s = 2 gives (6.2), and
below, we show








Then in the limit A 0
we obtain:
if (7.1)1/2 4 1/2M
[1/2] + (1 - if > 1/2 arid
- d/2)) (7.2)4 1/2 + (1 -
> 1/2if and
(7.3)> 1/2 + (1 - - (1/2))
will be available.
As can be seen, from equation (7.2), that even if the smaller of

























w (1 - w w1(l -
- 1/(1 - (pB/ln s2)], k - 1, 2; (1 - w^) can be interpreted 
K
as a measure of the likelihood that the outside option xB (k = 1, 2) K
wp(l/2) + 1)(1 - x®) +
















this theory of market in whichIn present thewe a a
of is decentralised. The of theagents
(i . e . rmarket the buyers and the sellers) do not. know eachex-ante,
location.others' The theory, therefore, includes matchinga
technology within which the agents search for with whom topartners
trade. When sellerand initiate sequentialmeet,aa a
If they reach an agreement
they leave the market.
Models of this type have been explored recently by various authors.
These models be distinguished by two main important factors: thecan
and
and search problem. the models presented inIn
Diamond and Maskin (1979) and Mortensen (1981, 1982),
the matching and search is modelled explicitlyprocess as a non-
cooperative game, but the events that follow a match are not modelled.
Rather, these authors that the parties reach agreementass ume an on
the terms of the suggested by the Nash Bargaining Solution.contract
On the other hand,
(1985, 1986), Gale and Herrero (1984), the
matching and search process is not modelled explicitly a la Diamond-
Mas kin-Morten sen, but they do explicitly model the bargaining process
non-cooperative in which bargaining procedurethe isas a game,
in Wolinsky (1987)described detail. the only thatpresents
with a
sequential bargaining model.
The raison d'etre of this chapter is now discussed.
(A) Firstly, model that will be presentedthe generalseems more
and less restrictive than any of the previous models mentioned above.
The matching and search model a la Diamond-Maskin-Mortensen has two
(i) all agents of the assumed,same are a
a linear or a
buyer     they 
bargaining process over the terms of trade.
the matching
Diamond (1982),
approach adopted with respect to (i) the basic bargaining problem, 
(ii)
paper
combines the model of matching and search of Mortensen (1982)
in the models presented in Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1986, 1987) and Binmore
major assumptions:  l t    m  type
priori, to search with the same strategy and (ii) the matching rate is 





(which will haveIn aour
will notto we
(i) that agentsin factrWe shall, assume
thatof the same type can
thefunction of theis some
in our model the rate at which a particular
affected by the searchwill beparticular buyer meeta
choices of the other agents.
Herrero
in view, iseach other. notleaveto ourare
seller meet they
isas
themention the difference betweenshallthis pointAt we





search while(1987) the matchedinwhereas can
onea
is in both andassumedstepmake therandom to our
(who hasmodelmodels. Now, to
or to
another choice: headdition to these two
’’the negotiating table’’) and search for(i.e.,the bargaining process
strategic decision;
This,
in Wolinsky/s  the agent
either to accept the offer,
bargaining procedures 
pair of agents who 
search
Wolinsky's 
react to the offer) has two choices,
type of agent.
framework similar
matching and search model 
that of Diamond-Maskin-Mortensen)
’’forced"
reject the offer and wait for a fixed time interval before proceeding 







genuine sequential bargaining a la Rubinstein (1982). 
in the model of Wolinsky (1987), when a buyer and a 
can bargain  long as they like;
modelled explicitly as
seller and buyer is not a
a strategic decision.
in the process of bargaining (over the terms of 
alternative  while bargaining,
procedure adopted by
(1987).   and Wolinsky's bargaining procedures
versions of the classic alternating-offers model of Rubinstein (1982).
The key ideas that lie at the heart of the difference between the two 
be put  follows.   model  matched
make these two assumptions, 
choose different search strategies and (ii) 
search choices of all
can withdraw from
Wolinsky    pair
bargaining. Let us elucidate. When a matched pair of agents go through 
round of bargaining, firstly  of the two agents is chosen at 
offer. This
A central feature of the non-cooperative strategic approach to the 
basic bargaining problem adopted by Rubinstein-Wolinsky-Gale-Binmore- 
(with the exception of Wolinsky (1987)) is the following. In 
these models the decision to abandon the bargaining between a matched 
the matched seller and
the choice to leave each other
In our model, as
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during the timein Wolinsky's model,an alternative partner. However,
search forsuccessive offers the agentsinterval between two can
and can therefore switch to alternative partnersalternative partners,
proceed to bargainduring this time interval and thus they may not
with each other in the next round of bargaining.
particularof thein favourhave the followingWe argument
answeringargument is basedTheassumptions that have chosen. onwe
timeinterval ofd'etre of theis raisonthe question, "what the
alternating-offersRubinstein-typesuccessive inbetween offers
is observe thatbargaining models?" starting pointThe to canone
therigidity ofRubinstein-type models with regard to thecriticise
timetable for making proposals; what constrains the players to the use
time betweenlength ofthis timetable (i.e., why have theof
shown thatBinmore (1987a) hassuccessive offers fixed exogenously).
Rubinstein-type model in which the intervalsit is reasonable to use a
a paradigm forbetween successive proposals vanishingly small asare
formally constrained byin whichthe the players not ancase are
further thatdetermined timetable. couldexogenously One weargue
put the time between successive offers equal toshould, at the outset,
then face the problem of indeterminacyas is well known,But, wezero.
could counter-argue that timeof the bargaining outcome. However, one
strictly positive if only forsuccessive offers bebetween must
interval time betweenlet there remain ofphysical So anreasons.
but interest will center on the interval tending tosuccessive offers,
d'etre of introducing a time interval betweenthe raisonThus,zero.
notion in thethe ofsuccessive isoffers to capture
eliminate the indeterminacy ofwhich happensbargaining process, to
view time betweenshould thebargaining Onethe outcome. gap
successive bargainingintegral part of thesuccessive offers as an
integral part of the bargaining process. The timeand thusrounds, an
thesuccessive is and parcel ofoffers partinterval between
andof the of offersthebargaining sequenceprocessprocess,
this time of search.forcounteroffers. One cannot use gap purposes
wishesif search forthustime, and agent totakesSearch anan






equilibria insymmetric equilibria (i . e . t agents same
forallowtheorychoose the strategy). Intype non-wesame our
allowed(i.e.,symmetric equilibria theof type toagents same are
the unique sub­choose different strategies) . thatHoweverf
symmetric. of theequilibrium isgame perfect A propertyoutcome
identical)equilibrium is that all choose thesellers (who sameare
(who are identical) choose the same strategy.strategy, and all buyers
important, justification forthird, and perhaps the(C) The most
wisdom,answering the question, is conventionalwhat theextent
that all 'frictionless' markets are Walrasian,
The main theorem will establish that all transactions take place at
in equilibrium).different prices (i.e., non-uniform prices emerge
This is tradersbecause the demand and as
leave the market
at which a matched pair trade depends on the state of the market, and
Firstly, the bargaining friction, which isthree types of frictions.
fixed time interval successivecaptured by the exogenously between
shall call this friction the Internal friction. Secondly,offers. We
isthe market friction, which captured by the search andcosts,
(in particular,
the equilibrium price. shall call this friction the ExternalWeon
Thirdly, there is the (common) rate of time preference.friction.
friction keeping the Internalthe External tends toAs zero,
friction and the rate of time preference strictly positive, all the
competitivethe equilibrium price.equilibrium prices tend Anto
explanation and interpretation for this is as follows. As the External




new traders who enter) .1 The price
This
and
(B) Secondly, most of the models mentioned above focus attention on 
which  of the
"to
correct?"
We will assume that all traders enter the market at one single time and that the 
market continues to operate until all possible transactions are completed, 
assumption is also adopted by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) and Binmore 
Herrero (1984, section 8).
We analyse the model with the assumption that there are more buyers than there 
are sellers. (The case whore thore are more sellers than there are buyers can be 
analysed in a similar manner - and the results would be 'symmetric' . The case 
whore tho number of sellers equals the number of buyers is somewhat different).
the current chapter is the new results and new insights it provides in
represents the extent to which the market environment
the fact that there are more buyers than there are sellers)2 impinges





of the market) are
in order to obtain the whole surplus.
to view this is as follows. we
will taken forshow that the agent toan
tends to zero.
market it is they (and not the buyers)
withis matchedadvantage. seller aa
since theInternal
taken for the findseller toto an
continuethanseller will always prefer change toto partners
bargaining with in the matchedhis buyer. Thus fcurrent essence.
in which the seller announcesseller and buyer play a one-shot game a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer.
Internal friction tends keepingOn the other hand, to zero,
friction time strictlythe External and the of preferencerate
positive, all the equilibrium prices tend to the bilateral bargaining
equilibrium price . explanation and interpretation for this isAn as
follows. The friction becomes infinitely large relativeExternal to
the Internal friction, and thus the market environment (in particular,
buyers than there are sellers) does notmore
impinge on the equilibrium prices, and thus a matched seller and buyer
become locked in hence the equilibrium
prices are the bilateral bargaining equilibrium price.
Internal frictions approachboth the External and theAs zero,
(i) all therate
and (ii)friction,
External frictionthat the and the Internalwill become clearIt
equilibrium prices, the oppositethe infriction are on
the effect of the
competition, whilefriction the effect of thefavoursExternal
Internal friction favours bilateral bargaining.
bargaining equilibrium price, if the Internal friction approaches zero 
at a higher speed than the External friction.
working, 
directions. As both of these frictions tend to zero,
Thus, competitiveness 
is characterised not by the removal of all frictions but rather by the
expected time
Since the sellers are on the short side of the
strictly positive and 
alternative buyer tends
matched”
exploit this to their
Since the
’’getting
able to play off the buyers, one against another, 
An alternative angle from which 






a bilateral bargaining game
the fact that there are
keeping the  of time preference strictly positive, 
equilibrium prices approach the competitive equilibrium price, if the 
External friction approaches zero at a higher speed than the Internal 






removal of certain frictions.
section 3,Section 2 describes model.of the chapter the In we
prove the existence and uniqueness of the sub-game perfect equilibrium
discuss the nature of the equilibriumThen, in section 4,outcome. we
and derive implications; implications providekey thesesome new





2 . THE MODEL
All the sellers are
A seller has one unit ofidentical.
onean
seller's valuethisunit of Aand one
andcommodity is normalisedtheof at azero,
thus,normalisedreservation price) isvalue at one;
they bargain thematched,sellerandWhen buyer overarea a
theyi . e . ,partition of the unit
the price of theifof trade (or,the terms you
timetime. Themodelconsidered in theThe market operates over
The market opens at time t=0, withdimension is continuous, real time.
that no new agentwhere M,NgjN.
The market terminates
min{N,M}transactions executed (namely,possiblewhen all are
transactions).
cited in theThe central idea common to all the models,REMARKS:(1)




and buyers in it the completion ofsellersnumber oftheof one
all traders enter the market at(ii)seller, one
until all possible transactionscontinuesmarket to are
assumptions is theof thethat either tosuggest one
investigate the implications threeof all thehasothers. One to
note that models which differ with respect towe
chosen s t ri ctly comparablenet (seeare
buyer's 
there exists a unit surplus between any buyer and seller.
M buyers and N sellers, 
of either type enters the market after time t=0.
assumptions. However, 
the particular assumption
transaction is immediately followed by the pairing of a new buyer and 
single time and the
only
reservation price) < 
(i.e . ,
’’superior”
assumptions regarding the relationship between the traders' 
in the market and time: (i) the market is in a steady state in terms
technology and then there is pairwise bargaining.
of the following three mutually
The agents in the model are buyers and sellers. 
And all the buyers are identical.
buyer is seeking to buy
(i.e . ,
surplus associated with the match; 
like,bargain over 
commodity). After they reach an agreement they leave the market.
indivisible commodity for sale, 
commodity.
operate
(iii) the number of sellers and buyers considering tocompleted, and 





Rubinstein (1987a) for discussionfurther In thisa
chapter have (ii); is alsowe
and Wolinsky (1986) and and Herrero
(1984 f section 8) .
(2) section 3 will analyseIn the withmodel the assumption,we
(The whereM>N. M<N similarcase can a manner.
However,
There be modelled,two to andare processes
the bargaining process. We,
isolation from the Secondly, describe theprocess. we
bargaining in isolation from the matching Andprocess process.
thirdly, combine the to describe precisely how thetwowe processes
market operates .
The Matching Process
of the model (i.e., the buyers
do not, know each others'ex-ante, location. Thus, an
agent of type will within the domain of a particularone
matching process, in order find the locationto of agent of thean
opposite type.
Formally,
of the stochasticparameters will beprocess . process
influenced by the choices of the agents. An agent chooses a
non-negative real number that hisrepresents search”. One can
interpret this non-negative real number the intensity of search.as
will only unmatched agentsthatWe "search". Matchedassume can
in of bargainingtheagents (cf.cannot theprocess
Introduction (section 1) for a justification of this assumption).
The time dimension of the stochastic process is continuous;
isThe of the defined bystate system the set W,space
W={w: w^U}, where U is the of all agents,set and w denotes set ofa
unmatched agents. Let X(t) denote the













state of the system at time t, 
X(0)=U (thus at t=0 all agents are unmatched).
the matching process 
firstly, describe the matching process in 
bargaining
be analysed in  very 
the case where M=N is somewhat different).








the stochastictime whenX(T)=w, where Then,t—T WG W .Suppose at
w,
[w minus (seller iand b-gw) , whereg w
pair caninstant in time onlyAssumption 1 that at onemeans any
instant ofsameor
Assumption 2
timewhere andX(T)=w,Let WG W . atsuppose
and buyer j
remain of the
time, and b • unmatched; this lengththat were
Assumption 2 embodies the Markovian property of 'complete lack of
this assumption the stochastic will bememory'; with process
Markovian .
let TV.; denote the random time takenLet wgW and 13
Assumption 3
VwG W, are independent random variables.










one and only one of the 
wij =
of time is t^,
(bj)
length of





mW_ mi n xi bjGw 
(b)
:si-" — -j 
and buyer j)], denoting seller i by s^ and buyer j by bj.
Suppose X(T+t-^)=w, 
t=T+ti+h all agents belonging to w excluding seller i and buyer j are 
unmatched. Then, the probability that seller i (Sj_) 
unmatched at time t=T+t^+h is independent
S^G w, 
to move from state w
Assumption 2 <=> T^j is an exponential random variable with parameter 






system moves out of 
following states:





{TV.} is an exponential random
TV=s^3<Tijl
and (c)
before time t=T+t^,  s^ j
and thus the probability is independent of tj_.
we have









parameter E bjGW 
exponential random variableJ with parameter 




(i . e ., the random time
for one pair to get matched,. given that the system is in state w).
Suppose that X(T) timeAnd T+t.atsuppose occursw.
this transition iswe
to the state for any ew and b^ew .ij j
descriptionThe motion stochastic isof the of the asprocess
follows: the process sojourns
timeof whose distribution function is exponential distributionanxywith parameter the process entersw
j withstatesone g w
ij
The stochastic andof theparameters are
interpretOne the rate atparametercan as,
i jand buyer matched, the of thethatget state
stochastic is shall describe how the searchsystem Wew. now
denote intensitiesand the search chosen by seller andLet n
Assumption 4
depend on the state of the stochastic system, butand e w;
t.
(1) Note that the search intensities depend on time to theREMARKS:
extent that the state of the stochastic system will depend on time.
search intensities(2) We have assumed that the
time in order to avoid needless technicalities that would arise when
defining the payoff functions.
the numberfor of sellers and theobserve that, wg W,We anynow
number of buyers is related as follows. Let w be any element of W. And
Then there are M-N+k buyers.let k be the numbers of sellers. This is
either left the market,have,N-k sellers in thebecause or are






















probabilities { [XVj/ (
Given Assumption 1,  have, 
wij is [IV./( 
J s
. When leaving state
{w1^
Both e^ ^ 
are independent of time,
intensities chosen by the unmatched agents influence these parameters.
































k dFk (•)(ii) 3fk(.)
for all p^q^j.
(d)









is continuous and twice differentiable on its 
define
matched with some buyer.
are M- (N-k)=M-N+k unmatched buyers, 
sellers, given that  and of  M-N+|w|=number of 



















domain. Let wgW and s^ew,
w choose the same
in 
en s
sellers belonging to 
by es) and all buyers belonging to 
choose the same search intensity (denote it by e^).
Since M is the total number of buyers, there 
Now define |w|=number of unmatched 
unmatched
is strictly increasing and concave









all mixed derivatives are zero).(i.e.,
(a)-(d) , is5REMARK: on
This completes the model of search and matching.
kdefine three functions derived from FK, thatwe
choose the same search intensityw
s
when sellers choose theThus, same
thethe same
of the facesseller meet
k. 2and >]R+Given Assumption 5 (c),
Assumption  (i.e., the assumptions
needed to prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the search 







---- = 0 for all s-gw and bvew.
P
32Fk (•)




ij - ves'eb'—k^' 




define f k :
Before we proceed, 
will be used later in the analysis of the model.
and buyers 
buyer and any 





Suppose all sellers belonging to
(denote it by es) and all buyers belonging to w choose the same search 
intensity (denote it by e^) . Then, j=Fk(es,e^,ek) , where ek=e£j with 






3Fk (•) SFk (•)
The Bargaining Process
Suppose time (t>0)at t seller get matched.some a a
of the parties is selected at random, with probabilityone
partition ofto the unit surplus which the othertopropose a
then withparty reacts ("A")acceptance rejection ("R")or or
rejection and search ("RS”). ofAcceptance proposal ends thea
bargaining time(at t) and both parties leave the market having
executed transaction. If proposal is then thea a same
at time t+A.
return to the matching process (at time t) search for altenativeto
partners.
(1) Suppose the two parties abandon each other in order toREMARKS:
search for alternative Andpartners. of them findssuppose one an
alternative partner. the partyIf who has found a new can
remember the (i.e., location) then
This means that
the above bargaining procedure has to be amended so as to include this
possibility. This would lead formulateto rather complicatedus a
bargaining procedure. In order to avoid this, and in order to retain
our initially proposed bargaining procedure, asssume that when twowe
(inabandon each other orderparties search for alternativeto
partners) they forget each others' "address", and thus cannot return
each other later time in future.at (However,a we















of his previous partner, 
he could use this as a threat against his new partner.
rejected,
(above) bargaining procedure is repeated A time later,





ineach other by face if i. e . r iffuture, they again, themeet
matching process matches them again).
(2) Unmatched matched who inagents cannot themeet agents are
process of bargaining. This is because matched agents who in theare
of bargaining do (i.e.,search searchnotprocess
requires time and thus the matched agents who in the ofare process
bargaining have abandon the bargainingto if they want toprocess
search (cf. the Introduction, where presented argument towe an
justify this assumption).
The model studied in chapter 3 has offers being
made alternatively and determined bynot random mechanism; thisa
ismodel based the classic works of Rubinstein (1982) and Stahlon
(1972) . idea of havingThe a
first suggested by Binmore (1987a), who applied the idea thewas to
Rubinstein (1982) model.
determined by random that bargaining procedurethea
becomes completely symmetric A>0 .for This will simplify theany
analysis. (As of fact, allmatter the in thisrecenta
The Evolution of the Market/Order of Events.
proceed toLet nowus
i . e ., combinelet search and matching with theus process
bargaining process, and show how they are interlaced.
The market operates in continuous, real time. consider theLet us
(T>0);market time assuming thatT the market isat still inany
operation.
At time and every agent haseachTr to be in and only one ofone
(i)the following classes: Class 1 (ii)
one,
and the pairs who last had a bargaining round at time T-A and decided
to continue bargaining),
round ofhavenot a a
describe precisely how the market operates, 
the
papers 
literature use the random mechanism to determine the proposer).
(iii) Class 3 (C3) := matched pairs who will 
bargaining since they last had  round of
One advantage of having the proposer being 
mechanism is
"advertise");
The bargaining procedure adopted here is a modified version of that 
studied in chapter 3.
random mechanism determine the proposer
(Cp := unmatched agents,
Class 2 (C2) := matched agents who will have a round of bargaining at 




where T>s>max(0,T-A),bargaining at some time s f
pairs who have left the market,
Therefore, time there will exist partition of theat T, set , U,a
of all agents into four mutually exclusive classes,
timethe of into the fourT,
Define the of the market at time T by its partition, ofstate Pt /
U.
The decisions that taken instantaneously, but sequentially, atare
time T are as follows:
First: matched pairs of Class 2 (C2) go through a bargaining round.
who abandoned each other
the First (above), during the round, choose,at
simultaneously, search intensities.
A history of the market until time T, atup
time T,
time t=T; this is characterised by the following data:
(I) For all t (T>t>0) the state of the market at time t.Pt'
and V matched pair(T>t>0)(II) (a) thet G
proposer,
(T>t>0)(III) For all t we
his intensity choice,have, search are
such a market history,denote denote the set of all




(iv) Class 4 (C4) := 




c2,namely C-^, C / C3
And let IP denote
C1(t) 
 where C2(t) (c C2(t)) 
matched pairs who abandoned each other at the bargaining round.
Let gT and Gt
but excluding events 
will include all the events that have occured from time t=0 to
C2(t),
(b) the proposal, and (c) the reaction of the responder.
and matched pairs of C2 
bargaining
ci
Let pT denote the partition of U at time T. 
all possible partitions of U, at 
mutually exclusive classes, C^ i=l,2,3,4.
we have,
x denote the share
that all agents maximise expected utility. Suppose 
an agent reaches an agreement at time t,
Second: members of C-^ 
stage
and V agent g
For all




haveunit receives. Thetheof that the may
on the state of the stochastic system, e (w)
the during which searched bythe Letstates agent
time interval during which,
searched withi=l, . (b) the agentand. , n,
strictlybeLet c a
c isconvex,
the (common) cost of search function.
Therefore the utility to the agent is :
i=l
i i+1] z
where r is the (common) rate of time preference, r>0 .
Informational Assumptions
shall modelthat the and the preferencesWe assume are common
knowledge the Thus the is completeofamongst agents. game one
information.
time isA history of market characterised by threethe Tat any
earlier underelements described the subsection headed,(I)-(UI) z
shall assume that elements (I) andWe
knowledge amongst the agents but element (III) is not(ID
common knowledge. an agent never knows the search intensitiesIn fact.
Therefore the of imperfectchosen by the other agents. isgame one
information.
isthere perfectthatshall recall;We assume anin particular, 
agent does not forget the faces of the agents he met in the past.
1 r E i=l
surplus   agent 
searched for some part of the time during which he 
Let e denote the search intensity chosen by the agent. This may depend 
(cf. Assumption 4). Denote
c[e(w±)]e
c[e(w±)]
^i'ti+i] denote the 
system was in state











was in the market.
intensity e(w^) .   : 3R+—>3R+   strictly increasing, 




Strategies, Outcome and Equilibrium
i
allrecall that G setwe
For
minus element (III) of Tata
denote this. Let
T T{ hT:hT=(gT/element (III)] f where g±G G1} .
VhT6HT, in and only of the fourtime iT,at agent oneone




(k=l,2,3,4) at time T.
hasi is in the market, and thus he(1) not no
(2) VhTGH?(C3), agent i has no decision to take at time T.
There
theat to aare
(if he isdecision, (i) selected to propose) ,
(if agent i or his partner




if the agent 
decisions on any hieH£(C2>.
(3) VhTGH?(C2), 
three decision points
represents the decision if 
while 
rn rn rn rn rnLet fT=(fi,f^,f^,f5).
*1' *2'
strategy for an agent i;
T denotes the









what proposal to make
(ii) how to react to the proposal (if he is not selected to propose) , 
and (iii) which search intensity to adopt
four
:H?(C2)xE?->[0,1],
f3 and as follows:
f : H? (C2 ) xeTx [ 0,1 ] x { "RS " } ->0R+, 
f4:Hi <C2* xEix[0,1]x{"RS"}->K+, 
denotes the search intensities chosen by agent i from 
Note that




has to take a decision.




g    is that part 
which is common knowledge amongst the agents.
m rnH denote the set of all such h , i.e.,
excluding the events at time T. 







fl-- ~ _ 
^:hT(C2)xeTx[0,1]-»{"A", 
where E?= {: ej_ 
time t=0 up until time t=T}.







can be any seller or 
of  market 
T T any g gG , 
time
agent i is matched and has a bargaining round, 
which  agent might have make
I
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i is timematchednot at T. Now
set
f J: (C-l) xE?xB [F (C2 ; hTe H? (C1) ) ]->K+ .
Define And define is a
denote the for




givenIF seller i and have a
andto wherean
T Tundefined IF given gxeG seller i either do not
have if they doa or
chosen to propose)
similarly defined,is but with the seller being chosen to
agent i chooses a search intensity.
= 0 IF agent i does not
Then, i=l
strategy for agent 
agent i.
fT f 2'
M+N strategy vector {Fj_}
Let us define what we mean by an outcome.
"search".
(gT)e[0,1]
propose)  they reach  agreement 








M+N an OUTCOME of the game, given {F^}.  is defined as :
Fi={fT:oo>T>0} . F± 
set of all strategies
T r-T given gxeG
and buyer j, 
bargaining round at time T, 
(and it is the buyer who is 
they do not reach an agreement.
gW 
bargaining round at time T
let F[C2;hTGH?(C1) ] 
denote a possible set of proposers, 
the matched pairs of C9 . And let 
possible e[F ( . ; . ) ]'s .
(4) Vh^e(C^) , agent i    at  T.  Vh^eH^(C^) 
there may exist pairs of agents that are in C2. Given an hTeH^(C]_), 
denote the matched pairs of C2. Let e [F (.; . ) ] 
offers and replies associated with 
2 • B[F (.;.)] denote the  of all 
Now define a function




(with the buyer chosen 
M+N
Let {Fi}i=l 
(xij(gT) , y —(gT) ) 
follows:
(M+N) strategy vector. Then VT and Vg^eG^, 
Vseller i, buyer jeU, and ej_(gT) Vagent
.J*
113
and Vseller i, buyer jeU}





Vi,vector where and for all
(M+N) vector of strategies, 
such that its restriction to any proper subgame is





{X£ j (gT) : VT, VgTeGT
adopt  subgame perfect equilibrium 
concept (Selten (1965, 1975)). A SGPE is a 
one for each agent, 
a Nash equilibrium.







recall that at time T there M+NUiUFi)
denote the personal history of agent 
point at time In­
decision points. Let v .
expected utility to agent i who has experienced the history of b? 





{ei<gT) :VT, VgTeGT and Vagent ieU} .
are a sequence of








andwith existenceTheorem that deals thefirst thestateWe
uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome, and then prove the Theorem.
THEOREM
there exists a unique(a) Given that there are N sellers and M buyers,
tradeof in which matched pair ofthe agentsa
(b) The price at which a matched pair of agents trade depends only on
the number of unmatched sellers and the number of unmatched buyers at
is matched; i . e . , the price is x(k) y (k)or
where
ofis of unmatched sellers r and,k the number





non-uniform pricesFurthermore, that haveof k) .the value note
conditionsis due the fact that demand-supplywhich to
state of the stochastic system, all the unmatched sellers(c)
the same search intensity. The
but depends only the number ofdependdoesw,weW, not on onw,
and the number of unmatched buyersunmatched sellers belonging to w,
andi . e . r (k+1) denote the searchbelonging to w;
unmatched buyer,chosen byintensities an an
k+1 unmatched sellers,given that there where k=N-respectively, are
history




instantaneously; where N,MeTJ and M>N.
and all the unmatched buyers choose 




change, as traders leave the market.
the time when the pair 





choose the same search intensity,
In this section we
or y(N-l) is the price   first matched pair trade) .
that the price does not depend on a particular seller  a particular 
depends  history only  the 
state of the stochastic system,
shall prove the existence and uniqueness of the 
sub-game perfect equilibrium (SGPE) ome. In the following section 










x(k) = max { h1(xk,yk) , h2(Xk) } (1)
l-y(k) = max { h3(xk,yk) , h4(Xk) } (2)
hi(xk,Yk) = (x(l)+y(l) ) /2][P (3)
h3(xk,yk) = (A) [ (1-x(1)+l-y(1))/2] (4)
and where















. (k+1) and h4(Xk)
where








and Xk={(x(1)+y(1))/2}^=0 , i 
are defined inductively by
l,N-2r . . . f1r 0, and,  course,  are M-N+(k+l) unmatched buyers. 
Note that the search intensity chosen depends on history only to the 
extent that history determines  state of the stochastic system, 
(which in turn defines the value of k).
i=l,2,3,4 are defined below.
w1'w2g^' lwil=k and 
occur from time t to
(A) =Prob[X(t+A) =w2|X (t) = 
the probability that 
is independent of 
assumed to be independent of
independent of  =>    process 
independent of t. h2 (X0 =VS 1)  ^) =Vb (k+1) , where Vs(k+1) 
Vb(k+1) are defined inductively by the following equations:
Vt , 
k-1 matches
Let xk={x (!) }i=0, Y.k={y (1) }i=q 
l,N-2,..., 1,0) . Then {x(k) ,y (k) 
following two equations:












is forthe Theorem true
M,
We now proceed to prove that the Theorem is true for (N,M) = (1,B+1) , 
where Me ON.
Principle of Induction, 
Since B is any element of 
true VN,MgIN such that M>N.
[M-N+k+l] + [Vs (k) -Vs (k+1) ] kf£+1
[k+1][M-N+k+1]f^+1
[k+l]+[Vb(k)-Vb(k+l)][M-N+k]f^+1





is based on the Principle of







The method of proof is as follows.
Induction. Take any element
where X(k)[x(k)+y(k)], Vs(0)=Vb(0)=0, and where {es(k+1),eb(k+1)} is 
the unique solution to the following equations:
(es(k+1),eb(k+l))
We will, secondly, assume 
where LeU, L>1, and then 
(N,M) = (L+l,B+L+l) . Then, by the 
the Theorem is true for (N,M) = (n,M+n) , VneU. 
we will have proved that the Theorem is
show that
  IN, say B. 
firstly prove the Theorem for (N,M) = (1,H+1) . 
that the Theorem is true for (N,M) = (L,B+L) ,
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as follows.Define two sets As
= { X : x
{ X :Ab =




(9)}x = max {




where (e*,eb) is the unique solution to the following equations:
is a SGPE payoff to the seller in a subgame starting with 
the seller's offer }
SGPE payoff to the seller in a subgame starting with 
some buyer's offer }
i=b,s.  firstly show that 





£=inx and M^=sup A^ 








same for all buyers;





s and Ab 
identical,
g[x+y]e







1•k1- ^(es,eb)] - M Fb(X)^( (14)eb> =






(9) and (10) .
LEMMA 1
-rA where isandIf XG A as
PROOF
inConsider the a a
z f








in the process, 
same intensity, e£, and that 
where (e*, eb)
s , yeA^  z=max{^[x+y]e 
defined by equation (11) , then zeA^ .
FS(X)
following strategies 
buyer's offer. The buyer offers price 
Lemma above, and the seller agrees to 
seller deviates,  ’’rejects”  "rejects and searches", 
all players follow equilibrium strategies that support the seller's 
payoff   y, according to whether in the  bargaining round 
(whenever it will take place) it is the seller or some buyer who is
= c'(e*)
secondly show 
★ ★ . say (x ,y ). This,
and Ab
also show that all buyers search with the 
seller searches with intensity e*,
and
and Ms=ms.
Thus the equilibrium price is unique 
identity;  will 
and the buyer who gets matched
3es
subgame starting with 
where z is as defined in the
b,  
"A*s,  is the unique solution to the two equations, (13) 
(14), as defined above.
system 
therefore, implies that Mb=mb 
sets As  are singletons.
independent of the buyer's 
instantaneously, between  seller, 
first with the seller.
unique solution,
Hence, the





















of above,1, madeIn Lemma three claims (withoutwe
(ii) that and thetoare
order to alternativean
partner), that
who is to and thator some





, then the seller will
gets 
defined by equation (11) . 
the payoff).
follow equilibrium strategies 
according to whether in the 









suppose s(X) <^[x+y]e 
which is equal to ^[x+y]e-rZ^ 
the buyer will get a payoff equal to [ (1-x+l-y)/2]e 









either "rejecting" or 










and given  all players 
that support the seller's payoff  y, 
next bargaining round (whenever it will take place)
buyer   selected  propose,  (iii) 
(X)+Ffc(X)<l. To prove these claims at this stage would interrupt the
the current argument. We will therefore defer the proof of 
these claims till later.
Suppose Fs (X) >2 [x+y ] e“rZ^. If the buyer 
equals Fs(X), then the seller will "reject and search", 
buyer will get a payoff equal to Fb(X), }? is as defined in 
equation (12) . (We will later on prove ^
we shall also prove later on that 1>FS(X)+F^(X).
l-z=l-Fs(X)>F^(X), and hence the buyer cannot profit from 
offering less than
proof):    Fs (X) 
seller and a buyer, respectively, 
(i.e., leaves his  in
Fs )  and thus the seller will not profit from 
"rejecting and searching"; if he 
equal to 2^x+yle-r^' and 
a payoff equal to F (X), 











This subgameexiststhat there ameans a
in this equilibrium is However t














Ms>l-max {[ 1-x+l- 



















Thus,   xgAs 
~r^,Fb(X)}. And hence,
[Ms+Mb]e ,.s 
accept. Since the buyer strictly prefers this, 
•1 
e-rA
1-Ms<max{^ [1-Ms+1-Mb]e rn,Fb(M)), 




perfect equilibrium in 
that starts with some buyer's offer such that the payoff to the seller 
if the buyer deviated and started 
max {j 
then the perfectness implies that the seller will
profitably by offering a price equal to max{
3z-^gAjd   M^>z^>max{ | [Mg+M^] < 
inequality defined by (15) must hold.
subgame
-rA,F (M) },
in the proof of Lemma
if xgAs, yeA^ an<^ l-z=max { g [ 1-x+l-y ] e
any ycAb, we have, 







Suppose the inequality defined in 













would be above Ms
Let be
s •
The second of the lemma follows immediately from thestatement
Q.E.D.
LEMMA 5
-rA , Ffc(M)} where [Ms4-M^] .
PROOF









1-MS.   perfect equilibria in  subgame
buyer's offer, the payoff to this buyer is at least 1-M^.
definition of M^.
1-Ms>max [l-Mg+l-M^] e~rA,Fb(M) }
perfect equilibrium in this subgame
This perfect equilibrium must be such that 
for otherwise the
and Ms+£,
1-Ms=max{ j [ l-Mg+l-Mfc] e
s. Thus, the initial hypothesis 
in all perfect equilibria of this subgame buyer i's 
payoff is at least 1-M
is false and so
p  a price between Ms 
candidate for an equilibrium in this subgame.
If the seller demands
and consider the following 
The seller offers p and 
buyer i accepts it.  more than p or if buyer i 
"rejects" or "rejects and searches", then all players continue as in 
the original perfect equilibrium. Thus, given our initial hypothesis, 
this is indeed a perfect equilibrium and the seller's payoff is p>Ms, 
in contradiction to the definition of M
Consider a subgame that starts with the seller offering to buyer i. 
Suppose that there exists   in 
which buyer i gets l-Ms-e.
there is no immediate agreement,  seller's payoff 




i . e . ,
he (to be shownor
no or








Before we (9) and (10) have a unique solution,
the claims inmade the Lemmas (X) and where X=on
(i) and (ii) that F (X)
if and given that all
selected toor some












By similar arguments 



















(M) } is the minimum payoff guaranteed to 
"rejects and searches"
• buyer will offer  accept price p 








payoff equal to Fb(M) .
S+1-Mble
If a buyer 
selection of the proposer 
-j s 1 r i —m 4-i —m. i a r/X
according to the 
(discounted) payoff 
searches", then he
(xgAs  yeAb) .






Lemmas 1-5 prove that 
equations defined by (9)






F   Fi_(X),  =i 




and a buyer, respectively, 
players follow equilibrium strategies that support the seller's payoff 
x or y, according to whether in the next bargaining round (whenever it 
will take place) it is the seller   buyer who is 
and yeAb), and (iii) that Fs(X)+Fb(X)<1.
[1-Ms+1-Mb]e ia,Fb 






buyer who is 
the equilibrium payoff 
as of time t?
such that
V R'b 1
VQ(b), ^b^lk-l   equilibrium ffs. These 
equilibrium payoffs are determined by the equilibrium search strategy 
choices.






For k=l,2 f . ..fM+lr
r t dk/x) t k (i
-r<<?"t)dq)] Xe-X<u-t> (18)du]
which sellerthe thewhere [x+y], rate at
where the ofsetare
|w|=lM+l buyers)f andthe seller and the
matched withis some buyer (i.e., thethe rate which the sellerat
since there is only one seller).rate at which a match forms,
are independentintensities ,that the search
Thisof time, the stateon w
k=l,... ,M+1) is independent time. With thisimplies that of
simplify equations (17) and (18) . We obtain (notecan
that the equilibrium payoffs are therefore independent of t):
(17a)
and for k=l,...,M+1,















V (t)= max [ 
es>0












unmatched agents (i.e., 
4k=<eb:biew'1,tk};
k M+1{eb}k=i'
(cf. Assumption 4) .
max PQ(e es>°




















Claim 1 shows that there exists
(18a). 6(17a) thetoa
3and Claim shows that thereare
Claim 1
(17a) (18a) (i.e.,solution andThere exists therea
Given Assumption
(i) Claim 2 shows that all
se K+-
to equations 




/X /X /XT- R+lA joint search strategy, e - (es, {eg}^ ^) , is a Nash equilibrium of 
the search game if and only if e solves equations (17a) and (18a).
(18a) , then it is an
r + X
Ve£e JR^, e
There exists a unique solution to equations (17a) and (18a) 
by e) ; with the property that eb=eb for k=l,...,R+l (i.e., 
equilibrium is symmetric) .
[1—X] xk- c(e£) 
pb(eb'^b'es> = --------------
We shall make the following assumption (Assumption 6, below), 
will ensure that if there exists  solution to equations (17a) 
interior solution (i.e., e>0.) •
The proof consists of three claims, 
solution  equations  and 
solution (s) are interior. Using this fact, 
Nash equilibria  symmetric,  (ii) 







is(1952)) . Thus all have do(see Debreu totowe
conditions are met.
(k=l, ...,M+1)and {e(1) The strategy sets {e are
will show belowtheyBut,convex. areare
suchreal positive scalars,that there exists
willthat the strategy sets
(k=l,...,M+1). These both[O,Qg]}be {e and are
well defined,(2) functions,The payoff are
continuous from the of thebounded;
(k=l,...,M+1)functions andand show thatWe arec .
strictly concave in

















































s:ese [0,Qs] ] 
convex and compact.
properties




it is clearfunctions andGiven assumptions the notcfour on
whether
We shall now prove the following statement:
stationary point (for theexistsIf there a
then it isinterior offunction in the
(I)
is indeed strictly concave in e s ’
If there exists any stationary points (i.e., local maxima localor
interior of then it must be theminima or saddle points) in the
case:
3ps(es)
is such a stationary point.= 0,
] = 0 (20a)
(using equation (19)) .
Using equation (20) r we have
32Xa2xi
[X+r]c’' (es) +
for any stationary point. that the second of theterm secondNote









It will then become clear that Ps
----- [c(es)] ] , 
3es
3X(es) 3X(es)




------  < 0.
Ps,     IR+) f 
unique and it is a local maximum.
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issincemaxima.localThus all stationary points Butare
local maxima there must becontinuous in between two aany
uniquestationary point, it isminimum. there existsHence, aa
This concludes the proof of statement (I), above.local maximum.
is continuous in (b)and(a) as
is(b)together with andStatement
such that VeSince Veb, theas —b
s *
in and showOne concavecan
Q.E.D.
Claim 2
(18a).solution of equations (17a) and Then,interioran
for k=l,...,M+l (i.e., all Nash equilibria are symmetric).
Proof
satisfies the first-ordersolution,is interiorSince eane














similarly prove that P^is strictly
V 
the existence of QgG •




and F1 and F^
ps
local
Ps—  es~>+°°, there exists Qse ]R+ 































and c, one obtains that
uniqueness
Theorem.































So we have to show that the Jacobian of the system (21)-(22) 
is negative quasi-def inite for all ee .
a unique solution e to (21) 
equilibrium expected utility payoffs
s,yb) and for k=l,...,M+1 
eb = E2(Vs,v£,v£)
using the assumptions on the
<0 for all
given an arbitrary 
(vs'<vbJkii) •
The equilibrium expected utility payoffs must be the 
buyers (i.e., for k=l, . . . , M+l) . Otherwise a buyer with a lower
payoff could imitate  buyer with a higher payoff; this is possible 
since all buyers are identical. This in itself does not imply that the 
buyers will choose the same strategy; it is possible that they obtain 
the same payoff by choosing different strategies.
Let the Jacobian J of the system (21)-(22) with respect to e at any 
eeJR^J2 be denoted by J==(aij]irj- Using equations (21) and (22) 
computes a^j for all i and j. And then, 
functions F^(cf. Assumption 5)
0 for all i^j. Thus J is negative quasi-definite.
equilibrium expected utility payoffs 









(21) (22) f(18a), and.equations (17a), weon




































* \ 1eb) = c'
a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
es
rVb = [1-X-(M+l) Vb] f b (e*
Let (e*,e£) be a
using 
given arbitrary vector (vszvt>) equilibrium expected 
utility payoffs, there exists a unique solution to (26) and (27), 





























(25) , (26)(13) and (14)(12) ,
with havewe








. s/^v. (ii) 
computed E's (Vb) and Eb(Vs), 
computes E"(Vb) and Eb(Vs).
(cf. Assumption 5) 
(iii)
E is strictly increasing), 
(iii) E(1)<1, and (iv) E 
obtain that E has a unique fixed point, 













E"s(vb)<(). Thus E" (Vs)>0.
Then Vs=l would be an 
VS<X and X<1. 
contradiction.
s' v '
E is strictly convex),
are equations (24), 
and F^(X)=Vx. Hence,
Equations (11), 
and (27), respectively, 
proved claims (i) and (ii)
Secondly, using the Implicit Function Theorem one obtains that, 
equation (24) defines s   function (say Es) of VK, and 
equation (25) defines Vb   (say Eb) of Vs. '
FS(X)=VS b(X b.
made  Lemmas 1-5 on FQ(X)
= Es<vb>




one obtains that E's (Vb) <0 and Eb(Vs)<0. Thus
In (i) we have
(i)
E's(vb) ana ^b v - s
(cf. Assumption 5) and c,
E'(VJ>0 E"(Vs)=E's(Vb) .E^(VS)+E" (Vb) ,E^(VS) . 
and therefore, by differentiating, 
using the assumptions 
and c, one obtains that E'b(Vs)<0 
Suppose E(l)/1, i.e., suppose E(l)=l. 
equilibrium expected payoff to the seller.
X=l, then VS<1. Thus, for all X, VQ 1  i.e., 
E is continuous.
Hence,   proved that 
equilibrium for the game of search, 
choose the  strategy. Let the 
x ‘A’<eS'eb)' and the associated  be denoted by 
(es'eb'Vs'Vb^ uniQue solution to the equations (24),
and (27) .
And then,
E'(Vs)=E's(Vb) -E'b(Vs) . Using 
d E (V ) . And then, using the
unique 
with the property that all buyers 
choices be denoted by 
<VS'Vb>• 
(25) ,
Below we shall prove:
(ii) E"(Vs)>0 (i.e., 
is continuous. Thus, 




from the fact that V <X andClaim (iii) (X)+Fb(X)<l) follows(i.e.f s
and (10) haveAll we have to do
a unique solution. the following(9) beand can
compact notation:




has existence). then theleast fixed (i.e., Weat useone
(i.e., uniqueness).
LEMMA 6 (Existence)




obtain that h:[0,l]x[0,l]—»[0,l]x(0,l].From (i) and (ii) Sincewe
are continuous functions of X, we have that h is continous on
by the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem, h has atTherefore,
least one fixed point.
Q.E.D.
LEMMA 7 (Uniqueness)








(Banach) Contraction Fixed Point Theorem to prove that h has precisely 
one fixed point
s and h2 (x) =l-max ( 
defined by equations
h (x) = [h-L (x) ,h2 (x) ] , 















now is to prove that
(10)





(i) V(x,y)e [0,l]x[0,l] ,
(ii) V(x,y)e [0,l]x[0,l] , 










condition in thecontractionSince differentiable theh is
is equivalent to:
I + I 3h-L (x) /3y I X (31)





| dFs(X)/dX | < X2 (34)
| 3(1—J; (1-x+l-y) e r^]/3x | + | 3[1-|(1-x+l-y)e (35)
| 3(l-Fb(X)]/3X | < X4 (36)
-rA
= —






(a) | 3hy (x) /3x 
and
(b) | Sh2 (x) /3x
| (x+y)e
rA] /9y I ^3
x2,
i.e., suppose 
| (x) /3y | =
rA]/3x | + | 3[g(x+y)e
, Fb(X)}
Below we shall prove that each of the following four functions is 
contraction: (i) I [ x+y ] e”rZ^, (ii) F (X) , (iii) 1-1[1-x+l-y] 
Z o Z
Thus 3 positive scalars X]_, X , X2 and Xd, 
such that
where h^ (x) =max {[ x+y ] e 
and where X=3j[x+y] .
a  if 
d[h (XjJ ,h(x2)]<Xd[xlzX2^'
Now suppose h^(x)CFS (X) , 
Then, | 3h^(x)/3x | +
[dFs(X)/dX](1/2) | 
Similarly, 
d[l-Fb(X) ]/dX | £ X4, using (36).
definition, above,
h:[0,l]x[0,l]—>[0,l]x[0,l]. By
point. Below we shall show that  is a Contraction.  by 
(Banach) Contraction Fixed Point Theorem h has one and only one fixed 
point.
rA]/3y | < X-l
max{^[x+y]e Fs(X)}=?s(X) .
|  Sh^ J d - | [dFs(X)/dX] (1/2) | + |
| dFs(X)/dX | < X2, using (34), and since X«l[x+y]. 
suppose h2 (x) «1-Fb (X) . Then, | 3h2 (x)/^x | + | dh?(x)dy | = |
Fs (X) } and h2(x)=l-max{|[x+y]e

133
. 0<£<l, wherefor allsinceLet
(31)such that andIt is clear that there exists
(32) are satisfied.
All we need to do
for 1=1,2,3,4, s . t.
-rA since A>0 and r>0.
]/2; and thus,
] / 2; and thus,
with strict inequality if X>0. Fs : [ 0,1 ] —» [ 0,1 ]VXe[0,1],
Let a1=sup{ [Fs(X)/X] :Xg [0,1] } . Now [FS(X)/X]<1, VX>0.
VX*0, x=o,i . e . ,Therefore For
Therefore,
(X) -a-iX<0, VXe [0,1] (37)
[0,1] .ofelementsbeLet
i. e.,
3 a positive real
such
tocan be proved using an argument similar 
to prove the existence of 1^.
Then
2





namely a-^, where 
d[Fs(Xi) ,Fb(X2) ]<a1d[X1,X2] .
] /3x
0<X3<l.
"rA<l,l+l d [| (x+y) e
namely X=£,


















Fs X " lX- ' v g
is a positive scalar strictly less than one.
r^]/dy | =e
scalar strictly less than 1, 
a1=sup{Fs(X)/X:Xe (0,1]},  that 
Thus X9=a1.
(b) Similarly choose X3=[l+e
X-^,X2  any
alXi] tFs<Xi)+alXi]~0 for 1=1,2, using (37); 
i=l,2. Thus (fs(X1) ]2+[^^'v^' 12<-^2rv2^v2 
<[Fs(x1)]2+[fs(x2)]2<a1^x^+x^.
a X,
now is to verify that 3 X2, X3, X4 , 
(33)-(36) are satisfied.
(d) the existence of X4 





wherethat the for Lg Mtrueassume
Define two sets B as follows.
{ x :
matchedthe the seller isoffer, when some
M+L buyersbuyer, andand all the other sellersL are
unmatched }
Bb = { is subgame starting withsellerx a
is matched withthe selleroffer, when some
H+Lbuyer, sellers and buyersand all the other L are
unmatched }
identicalSince (i) identical,REMARK: the sellers are
and (ii)
the set B




for i=l,2,3,4 are defined below.
(A) (1/2) [x(l)+y (1) ] (40)Jl (x,y) = (1/2) [x+y]e
indefined thewhere Theoremand are




L-l E 1=0J3(x,y) = (l/2) [l-x+l-y]e
firstly show 
solutions for the following system










SGPE payoff to 
seller's
n^=inf  N£=sup B^ 








and L>1, and then show that the Theorem is true for (N,M) = (L+l,M+L+l) .
max { J1(x,y), J2 (X) 
1-y = max { J3(x,y), J4(X) 
where X=^[x+y] and
It is easy to check that 
for (N,M) = (1,M+1) .
a seller in ax is a
having 
strategy sets and payoff functions,  the buyers are identical, 
having identical strategy sets and payoff functions, s and Bb 
are independent of the particular seller and the particular buyer who 
are matched.
we have indeed proved that the Theorem is 
proceed to the second stage of the 
Theorem is u   (N, M) = (L, M+L) ,















and the buyer who matchedget
(











, * * \ f / * \(es,eb)=c'(es)
<es'
. * * x (es,eb)





(e*,e^) is the unique solution to the
+ [Db-J4(X)][M+L]fg+1
where DS=VS (L) r
(part (d)), X=Jj 
following two equations:
We secondly show that the system (38)-(39) 
"/r "A*say (x , y ) . This, therefore, implies that N^n^ ana INs=I1s* 
sets Bs and B^  singletons. Thus the equilibrium price 
first matched pair is unique and independent of the particular seller 
and the particular buyer who get matched first; trade will 





are defined in the Theorem
a unique solution, 













in the untilalso show that upprocess,
allall withsearch the
the where thesame
firstOnce the pair there thenmatched leave the market are
(N,M) = (L,M+L) The Theorem is for this. Thus ,assumed true we
(L+l,M+L+l).(N,M)
solutions for the systemare
the payoffs to a seller and a buyer,are
(which impliesof L+l sellersnone
that none of the M+L+l buyers are matched), and given that all players
seller's payoffa orx y
in the next bargaining round (whenever it takes
place, and whomsoever the matched pair) it is theare
buyer who is selected to propose;
Then we shall prove that
sellers are unmatched (and therefore. all
unmatched). And first matchthat when theare suppose
follow equilibrium strategiesthe players thethat supportoccurs,
seller's payoff y according to whether it is the the
isbuyer who selected and is theWhatto propose
equilibrium payoff to seller 1 a buyer kand toa
(for k=l, .. .,M+L+l), as of time t?








L+l E i=l i*l






















will have proved that the Theorem is true for
By arguments similar to those presented in Lemmas 
that both (x,y)
follow equilibrium strategies that support 
according to whether
Let {vl(t)}^ih {v£(t)}^+1
payoffs are determined by the equilibrium search strategy choices.






of equations defined by one would have








xeBs and yeB^. We will prove this.
(38) and (39) have a unique solution.
intensity,








is part of1, if not
and the match
we haveu.
i.e.f independent of time and independent of i and jr
and independent of 1.
For k=l,...,M+L+l
tfi <x£/X) t K -r(u-t)
(47)du ]
the rate at which buyer k gets matched.
intensities,that the searchWe note are
theindependent of time,
j=l,...,M+L+l) isandi=l,..., L+lThis implies that (for4) .
can simplify equationsindependent of time. we
equilibrium payoffstheobtain that(46) and (47) . (noteWe are







































where ec={e^} ,-s s 1=1 
defined below:
utility payoff to seller
pair but the first matched pair is seller i and buyer j,
Since the Theorem is true for (N,M) = (L,M+L) ,
(e£) e





Vg(u; i, j)=VS (L) , 











the L+l sellers and M+L+l buyers) , |  L+l;L+l +L+l  o +L+lE XV •] the rate at which a match occurs, X?=  X-. -, i=l j=l i . . 13












earlierof that usedmethodthe to provewas











A joint search strategy,  a Nash equilibrium of the
search game if and only if e solves equations (46a) and (47a).
[X-Xf]Ds
r 4- X
(47a) , then it is an
There exists a unique solution to equations 
a a n *
it by e) ; with the property that e;;=es for 1=1, . . ., L+l, 










----- , where =Vb(L).
(46a) and (47a) (denote 
and eg=
By using    proof
Proposition 1, and arguments similar to those presented there, one can 
prove Proposition 2 .
We shall make the following assumption (Assumption 7, 
will ensure that if there exists  solution to equations 
interior solution (i.e., e>0).
A* A*Vs  denote the equilibrium payoffs 












All we have to do havenow
solution. as
where x= [xzy] and and
(38)(cf.










and the andJ J
























(1~X(1) ] ] ,



















A proof similar 
only one fixed point. 
and
equations (38) and (39) 
be represented  follows:












h^ (x) =max (J1 (x) , J2 (X) ) , 
and (39) ) .
Jl' u2' u3 






A-J [X(1)J and X(l)




is to prove that
Let (38) and (39)




A proof similar to that
one fixed point. VXe [0,1], J2(X)e [0,1]
that J±(X)>0 for i=2,4  J2(X)=VS(L+l)
Secondly, by induction  proves that VQ(L)<(1/L)[ Z 13 l l
one shows that J^(X) < [ 1/(L+l) ] [X+A] , e[0,l with strict inequality 
if X^O, =^Z^X(1) (1) g (1) (1)], which in turn implies 
Thirdly,   that Vb(L)<[1/(M+L) ]
J4(X)<[1/(M+L+l)][(1-
L-lstrict inequality  X^l, where B= Z^[1-X(1) ] , 
implies that J4(X)<1. V(x,y)g(0,1]X[0,1],






4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOLUTION
inthe equilibrium outcome,examine howIn this section shallwe
prices)r depend ontrade (i.e.,particular the equilibrium terms of
firstdo this, shallbeforethe parameters of the model. But, wewe
make two observations:
Introduction (section havementioned in 1) , not(1) theAs we
(who are mentionedas various authorsfocused on symmetric equilibria,
established thein The Theorem hasthe Introduction) have done.
non-symmetricexistence forof unique SGPE outcome,a
strategies. Furthermore, Theorem hasthe
(i.e., all buyers choose the same strategy,SGPE outcome is symmetric
and all sellers choose the same strategy).
transactions take(2) that all theThe Theorem has established
innon-uniform pricesplace different prices (i.e.,at emerge
supplyequilibrium) . is demand andthis that theforA reason
conditions change (and thereleave the markettraders no newareas
trade thetraders who enter) . two matched pairsthat atNote never
same instant in time, since the matching process matches agents one at
matchedtime. (Of it is possible, for example, that twoa course,
pairs trade within one-millionth of a second, or that all trades occur
within one-billionth of a second).
frictions. Firstly, thethree ofmarket, and types
A, time betweenwhich captured by the thefriction, is parameter
(A>0). call this friction parameter theshallsuccessive offers We
which isfriction,Internal friction parameter. Secondly, the market
function, thesearch c(-) , and representscaptured by the ofcost
(in particular, fact thatextent to which the market environment the
impinges thethere sellers)there than onaremoreare




established that the unique
buyers
equilibrium price. We shall call this friction parameter the External




the External friction thebecomesparameter
Internal friction parameter and the rate of time preference strictly
positive.
theThe External friction is represented by costparameter
function, Since it does not make becomescO .
(which satisfiesnegligible we shall where a>0assume that
strictly increasing and strictlyour proposed properties of i . e . fc,
andconvex) . And thus, let the Externala bewe
for k=0,1,..., N—1,Let
where defined inare
the Theorem. (k+l;a,A) (k+l;a,A) ,Let
for where in theare
Theorem.
Firstly, that a—>0 (i.e., thefornotewe any as
either l>x(k)>0 andif,
(k=0,...,N-1), and l>y(k)>0 (k=0,...,N-1), thenor
(since search costs approach obtain that (k+l)->+oozero we
x(k)=y(k)=la—>0 . Thirdly, if thenas
x(k)=y(k)=0a—>0. ifFourthly,as
a—>0 .(k+1)—>0 Since for alland
(k=0,1, . . . ,N-1)k bothoror
and a—>0, that for all kas we
a-»0, where(k+1) ) —>+°° as
sellers,k+1 unmatched
and M-N+k+1 unmatched buyers. Thus, as
a-»0 for (k=0,...,N-1),all k i.e., the an
frictionExternaltends theagent to to zero as
parameter tends to zero, whatever the state of the market, and keeping
A>0 and r>0.



















k=0,1, . . . ,N-1,
es (k+1) -++«>
(k=0,l, . . . ,N-1) 
rk+1 
U
x (k) =Lim x (k; a, A) 
a—>0
{x (k; a, A) , y (k; a, A) }
y (k) =Lim y (k; a, A) , 
a—>0
the equilibrium prices,
and Vb (k+1) =Lirn V 
...N-l 
i=0










hence we will examine what happens to the equilibrium prices as a—>0, 
keeping A>0 and r>0 .
(es(k+1),eb






c (e) = ae
ee IR+,
zero as a—>0) . Secondly, 
l>x(k)>0
eb (k+1) —>+°° 




any seller get matched,
to say that c(')




We first of all examine what happens to the equilibrium prices as 
negligible, keeping








-he rhe F _ere
rhe‘ s v~ • < v '■
_k-l x k= ?,a__
a—<x k= 1, . . N) ancanya._
A>0 .an\ an an
and
(2) r we
(1/2) [x(O)+y(O) ] ,
and
(1/2)[1-x(0)+l-y(0)], (49)
where a(1) 2(x(l)4-y (1) ] .
SubstituteLet
we
for k=0,1,...,N-1,Equation (49) becomes,
1-y(k)=e (49a)






Put k=0 into equation (48) .
i.e., x(0)=y(0). Now substitute this
-rA[[l-x(0)+l-y(0)]/2]
x (k) {e rA
1-y(k)=maxte-rA
Thus, in addition to a—»0,  will assume that the number of agents 
becomes infinitely large. This will simplify the analysis below.
(l/(k-rl)) [ f X(l)]} 
1=0










(M/N)=P where P>1. Thus M=£n.
equation (49) for M using M=pN. Then let N—>-h*> . Thus [1/(M-N+k+1) ] = 




and we obtain that,
S in re as a—*0
(0).
(49a) with k=0, 
x(0)=y(0)=l into equation (49a),
ebrain rhar
Cl am, 4 can
us we shall
. e - . k-1' , e*_ xk-1
We know that M>N.
Skl(A'-0















x(k)=l.For k=0,1, . . .,N-1,
Proof (by induction)
x(0)=l x(k-l)=l, x(k)=l. ThusNow we assume
(i) (51)assume
Then x (k) = [l/(k+1)] [ [[x(k)+1]/2]+k], Substitute this
into (51) , and hence r i • e . t which is true






Thus (50) and Claim imply,5 for k=0,1,...,N-1,
for k=0,1,...,N-1,(Hence, (k+1)—>+°° and e^tk+l) —>0 as
a-»0) .
Therefore, External (a) tendsthe toas
theand numberas
1) ,constant greaterconstant, a
for k=0,1,...,N-1,
that the of timeNote
kept strictly positive.preference (r) are
thisBefore we















of agents become infinitely large 
strictly q   than
y (k;a)->l, 




the result that 
x (k) =max{e“r^,
this into (52) , and 
<=>e“rA+l+2k<2 (k+1) e-rA<=>l<e~rA,
explanation and interpretation of 









i.e., all the equilibrium prices tend to 
the sellers take all the surplus.
(A) and the rate
and thus x(k)=l.









We usedobtain this result. It ist of course,
the subsequent(49) , and thereforeit it simplifies equationsince
analysis.
the isexplanation interpretation for above resultandAn as
friction parameter, thefollows. the External tendsAs toa, zero,
(since they are the short side of the market)sellers on
in order to obtain the whole
surplus. The fact that the
Internalshall show later that if the(We on
friction parameter, also tends then the above result mayto zero
not be obtained).
As the External friction parameter (a) we have shown
that the expected time taken for tendsan agent to
on the short side of the market it is
(and not the buyers) exploit this their advantage.they who tocan
is matched with Since A>0seller and since thea
alternative buyer tendsan
(as oc—> 0 ) f the seller will always prefer to change partnersto zero
than to continue bargaining with his current buyer. Thus , in essence,
the matched seller and buyer play a one-shot game in which the seller
For k=0,1,...,N-1,







Suppose      a buyer, 
expected time taken for the seller to find
to approach (0,0) along the path indicated in Figure 
(Call this path ?c).
Lim (a, A)-»(0, 0)
Lim (a, A)—>(0,0)
becomes infinitely large (keeping [M/N]>1)”,   necessary to 
a sufficient assumption.
Lim [Lim x(k;a,A)]=l and Lim [Lim y (k; a, A) ] =1.A-^0 a-X) A—>0 a—>0
’’getting matched”
play off the buyers, one against another,
Internal friction parameter A is strictly
positive is important.
A,
announces a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer.
are able to
tends to zero,








frictionThus, both Internal the Externalthe and. parametersas
all the equilibrium prices tend totend to zero,
A—>0) ,the Internal becomes negligible (i.e.,parameter




first A->0,observe thatWe as
forSecondly, we
[1-x(k)+l-y(k)].2
(2) ,using equations and(1)Thus, made
[(x(k)+y(k))/2]k=0,1,...,N-1,have, forabove, and
which gives, for k=0,1,...,N-1,
x(k)
Internal parameterthe tendsTherefore, toas zero,
andk=0,1,...,N-1,for
Note of time
along the path Pc, 













(A)—»0 for l^k and Pkk(A)—>1.
Vs(k+l)<X(k)=l[x(k)+y(k)]
We now proceed to examine what happens to the equilibrium prices as 
friction
x (k)=Lim x (k;a,A)  y (k) =Lim y (k; (X, A) , 









y(k;a,A)-i.e., all the 
equilibrium prices tend to the bilateral bargaining equilibrium price.
that the External friction parameter and the rate
J
146
preference are kept strictly positive.
As
A—»0 and a>0,
Internal friction, and thus thetheto




Lim [Lim x (k; a, A) ] =1 and Lim [Lim y (k; a, A) ] a—X) A-X) 2 a—X) A—XTFor k=0r 1t ...tN-lt
equivalent to following doublerepeated limits theThe above are
limits: for k=0r1r ...tN-l,
x (k; a, A)
(54)
y (k;a, A)
(a, A) along the path indicated in Figureto approach (0,0)allowing
(Call this path Pm).2, above;









in sharp contrast   stated in equation 
An explanation and interpretation for
Lim (a, A)-»(0, 0)






(shown in Figure 
’’dominates”1),      parameter
Internal friction parameter,  the market environment impinges 
on the equilibrium prices -  the result is the competitive 
equilibrium price. On the other hand,  (a, A) -»(0,0) along the path 
(shown in Figure 2), it is the Internal friction parameter 
” the External  parameter,  thus
Pm 
"dominates  the market 
environment does not impinge on the equilibrium prices at all - hence
along the path Pm, all the equilibrium prices tend to 
the bilateral bargaining equilibrium price.
particular,       buyers 
sellers) does  impinge   equilibrium prices, 
matched seller and buyer become locked in a bilateral bargaining game 
equilibrium prices  the bilateral bargaining
(53) and depicted in Figure 1.
this is as follows. As (a, A)(0,0) along the path P
An explanation and interpretation for this result is as follows, 




the result is the bilateral bargaining equilibrium price.
frictionInternalExternal friction and thetheThus
oppositeprices, inworking, theare on
tend theboth theseof toAs zero,
while the effecteffect of the External friction favours competition,
itof the Internal friction favours bilateral bargaining. Furthermore,
marketfrictions which makes theremoval of alltheis not
Externalis obtained if thecompetitive; the outcome
friction approaches zero at a
resultsresults, commentssomeour
choose their paper forWe
contains thoughts the(i) it of the recenttwo some onreasons:
same assumptiontheir model contains theand (ii)literature, as our
presence in themodel regarding the relationship between the traders'
the markettime, namely, that all tradersmarket and atenter one
operate until all possiblesingle time and the market continues to
their model is directlytransactions completed, and thusare
comparable to our model.
athat anonymity impersonal interaction)first (i.e., laWe note
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) (see also Rubinstein (1987a), pp.21-23)
In our
players' depend the entireallow themodel to onwe
conditions under which the uniqueexistand then there sub­history ,
coincides withequilibrium the competitiveperfect outcomegame
the frictionWhat twomatters parameters,are
Furthermore,
of equilibriaresults,from weour
obtained in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986)






(see their Proposition 1) 
is They 





namely the Internal and the External friction parameters, 
conclude that the multiplicity
is not necessary to obtain the competitive equilibrium outcome, 
strategies
light of 
obtained by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986).
suggest this not to be the case, 
buyers is strictly greater than the number of sellers and it is rather 
natural to expect that this fact alone would exert sufficient pressure 
to guarantee the competitive price and that the absence of frictions 
would just reinforce it”, (p.8). In their model there is no friction 
parameter that captures the   (in particular, 
fact that there are more buyers than there are sellers).
we makeIn the on the
competitive




equilibriumenvironment impinge outcome.market thecannot on
reinforcethe theabsence of frictions wouldFurthermore , not
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